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The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) defines insider threat as the 
risk posed by workers with inside access and knowledge to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
nation’s transportation systems. In recent years, insiders have been leveraged by criminal 
and terrorist organizations to further nefarious plots in the aviation system. This thesis 
examines policy options for TSA to mitigate insider threats in the domestic aviation 
system and discusses the effectiveness of TSA’s insider threat programs. This thesis also 
explores whether TSA can be more effective at insider threat prevention with additional 
intelligence collection authorities. The insider threat programs of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the United Kingdom’s MI5, and federal defense contractor Lockheed 
Martin are analyzed to identify alternative solutions. At their core, insider threat policies 
center around three primary areas: security programs, counterintelligence programs, and 
organizational culture. TSA should establish its own counterintelligence program 
while continuing to fine-tune its security programs. Integrating counterintelligence and 
security programs enhances an organization’s ability to detect and prevent insider 
threats. Finally, taking additional steps to establish a strong security ethos within the 
airport environment will help further “harden the target.”  
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The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) defines insider threat as “one 
or more individuals with access and/or insider knowledge that allows them to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the nation’s transportation systems with the intent to cause harm.”1 
Well-placed insider threats are ideally positioned within the nation’s aviation system to 
further terrorist plots, carry out illegal smuggling operations, and conduct espionage. The 
literature demonstrates TSA operates several security programs designed to mitigate this 
threat, but these programs have some notable limitations. Recent terrorist plots within the 
national and international aviation systems have leveraged or attempted to leverage 
trusted insiders, thus highlighting the urgency of the issue for TSA. 
TSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agree insider threats represent 
one of aviation security’s “most pressing concerns.”2 TSA employees alone account for 
over 50,000 aviation workers nationwide with access to sensitive areas and information at 
domestic airports. A 2017 House Homeland Security Committee report cites 
approximately 900,000 aviation workers at approximately 450 federalized airports.3 
Herein lies the potential insider threat within the aviation system from both TSA 
employees and other workers. Trusted insiders are familiar with weaknesses in internal 
policies and procedures, physical security, and information technology systems.4 Many 
of these employees are granted secure identification display area (SIDA) badges, which 
give them physical access to many of the most sensitive areas of an airport, including 
planes on the runway and passenger baggage transiting areas.5  
                                                 
1 Frank Deffer, Transportation Security Administration Has Taken Steps to Address the Insider Threat 
but Challenges Remain (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector 
General, 2012), 2. 
2 Jennifer A Grover, Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit 
from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2016), 22.  
3 John Katko, America’s Airports: The Threat from Within (Washington, DC: House Homeland 
Security Committee, 2017), 2.  
4 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 4.  
5 John Roth, TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (OIG-15-98) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2015), 8.  
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The severity of this threat to the domestic aviation system is significant and 
demonstrated by the following incidents. In 2013, avionics technician Terry Lee Loewen 
of Wichita, Kansas, attempted to detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 
outside the passenger terminal of Mid-Continent Airport from the secure (runway) side of 
the airport.6 Another example is the 2009 case of Rajib Karim, who worked as an 
information technology employee with British Airways and was in regular contact with 
an overseas, al-Qaida terrorist leader of significant stature. Mr. Karim used his employee 
access to identify vulnerabilities and opportunities to attack the aviation system, 
including the recruitment of baggage handlers to place an explosive device onboard a 
U.S.-bound aircraft.7 In 2014, Mark Quentin Henry, an employee of Delta Airlines, 
smuggled 153 firearms onto 17 different flights between Atlanta and New York City 
using his employee access to avoid scrutiny.8 These cases illustrate serious vulnerabilities 
to insider threats within the aviation system. 
This thesis reviews and analyzes the insider threat programs of four organizations 
in addition to TSA: the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A), the FBI, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI, 
part of MI5 in the United Kingdom), and private company / federal defense contractor 
Lockheed Martin. Identifying the best practices from these organizations helps in 
analyzing the effectiveness of TSA’s insider threat measures. This thesis also explores 
whether TSA can be more effective at insider threat prevention with additional 
intelligence collection authorities.  
TSA currently mitigates insider threat issues through a variety of security 
measures and employee training initiatives.9 These measures include the agency’s Insider 
Threat Working Group and Insider Threat Section, which are responsible for developing 
                                                 
6 Cassandra Lucaccioni, “61st Terrorist Plot Against the U.S.: Terry Lee Loewen Plot to Attack 
Wichita Airport,” The Issue Brief, no. 4110 (December 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2013/12/terry-lee-loewen-terrorist-plot-in-wichita-kansas-airport.  
7 “Terror Plot BA Man Rajib Karim Gets 30 Years,” BBC News, March 18, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12788224.  
8 Katko, America’s Airports, 9.  
9 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 28–29.  
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an integrated strategy for addressing these threats. TSA also performs airport 
vulnerability assessments and monitors information technology systems for indicators of 
insider threat behavior. Finally, TSA conducts name-based vetting for criminal or 
terrorism records for all TSA employees and aviation workers. The gap in these measures 
is that despite initial and recurring employee vetting, some insider threats are not being 
detected during the planning stages. It is worth considering whether more can be done to 
detect radicalized or criminal insiders before they have a chance to act. More specifically, 
is there a role for counterintelligence in TSA’s insider threat programs?  
The literature reveals that I&A, the FBI, and Lockheed Martin are operating 
or developing internal counterintelligence programs to mitigate insider threats. 
Counterintelligence is inherently an offensive measure as compared to security programs, 
which are defensive in nature. Additionally, counterintelligence is often clandestine 
activity conducted for national security purposes against a target with suspected or known 
affiliations with a foreign intelligence service or foreign persons, or an international 
terrorist organization.10 Some of the more aggressive counterintelligence measures 
include double-agent operations and controlled source operations with the intent to 
collect intelligence on a target.11  
Ultimately, the research demonstrates there are three key aspects of a model 
insider threat program: security, counterintelligence, and organizational culture. One of 
the weaknesses of the TSA insider threat program is its focus on detection and response. 
The program assumes there will be an ideologically or criminally driven individual 
lurking in the shadows and waiting for an opportunity to leverage legitimate employee 
access to further a plot. While this scenario is plausible, TSA’s program tends to ignore 
the ability of an organization’s cultural factors to prevent an insider threat from acting 
due to an established security awareness ethos. CPNI and Lockheed Martin are two 
organizations that heavily emphasize an organizational culture of security awareness as 
an insider threat mitigation cornerstone.  
                                                 
10 Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg., 3 CFR, § 2.4 (1981), https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12333.html, 24.  
11 Mark L. Reagan, ed., Terms and Definitions of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 52.  
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This research also suggests the first goal of an insider threat program should 
be prevention by not employing someone who poses an insider threat in the first place. 
The next goal is to deter the insider threat from acting through the perceived likelihood 
of discovery. Finally, if an insider cannot be deterred, TSA should have the ability to 
detect and investigate the insider threat. A comprehensive insider threat program must 
incorporate all three of these goals.  
Successful insider threat programs require a strong balance between security, 
counterintelligence, and organizational culture. The end goal should be to intersect 
security and counterintelligence programs. In the words of Robert Hanssen, arguably the 
most damaging American spy for the Soviet Union, “CI [counterintelligence] attacks the 
actor. It attacks the opposition intelligence structure. It is not speculative. CI feeds 
security because it helps them focus on meaningful measures and safeguards. Using CI to 
help security is just smart security.”12 This thesis recommends focusing on identifying 
methods for TSA to develop a counterintelligence program, creating a more visible 
security presence in the SIDA areas of the airport, and improving the security ethos 





                                                 
12 Mark L. Reagan, Introduction to U.S. Counterintelligence-CI 101, a Primer (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2005), 11. 
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According to Congressman John Katko, member of the House Homeland Security 
Committee,  
There is a vast network of approximately 450 airports in the United States 
that are under federal supervision and control. They serve as a critical 
component of America’s economy connecting people and goods from 
rural and urban communities across the United States and the world.1  
This thesis discusses the impact that an insider with nefarious intent can have on the 
American aviation system and the problem space surrounding the “insider threat.”  It also 
provides recommendations for mitigating this threat in the domestic aviation system. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) defines insider threat as “one 
or more individuals with access and/or insider knowledge that allows them to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the nation’s transportation systems with the intent to cause harm.”2 A 
well-placed insider is uniquely positioned to conduct espionage, illegal smuggling, and 
terrorist attacks.   
The severity of this threat to the domestic aviation system is significant. A notable 
terrorism case involving an insider threat is that of Terry Lee Loewen in Wichita, Kansas. 
In 2013, Mr. Loewen was an avionics technician at Mid-Continent Airport and used his 
insider access to attempt to detonate a vehicle borne improvised explosive device at the 
passenger terminal from the secure (runway) side of the airport.3 Another example is the 
2009 case of Rajib Karim who worked as an information technology employee with 
British Airways and was in regular contact with an overseas, American al-Qaida terrorist 
                                                 
1 John Katko, America’s Airports: The Threat from Within (Washington, DC: House Homeland 
Security Committee, 2017).   
2 Frank Deffer, Transportation Security Administration Has Taken Steps to Address the Insider Threat 
but Challenges Remain (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector 
General, 2012), 2.  
3 Cassandra Lucaccioni, “61st Terrorist Plot Against the U.S.: Terry Lee Loewen Plot to Attack 
Wichita Airport,” The Issue Brief, no. 4110 (December 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2013/12/terry-lee-loewen-terrorist-plot-in-wichita-kansas-airport.  
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leader of significant stature. Mr. Karim used his insider access to identify vulnerabilities 
and opportunities to attack the aviation system, including the recruitment of baggage 
handlers to place an explosive device onboard an aircraft bound for the United States.4 In 
yet another example, in 2014, Mark Quentin Henry (an employee with Delta Airlines) 
smuggled 153 firearms on 17 different flights between Atlanta and New York City by 
using his employee access to avoid scrutiny. Henry was assisted by three other airline 
employees to further his criminal activity.5 These cases illustrate the severity of the 
insider threat to the domestic aviation system. 
This thesis examines TSA’s current policies for identifying and mitigating insider 
threats within the domestic aviation system and evaluates their overall effectiveness. 
Simply stated, it studies whether TSA’s current insider threat program is effective at 
identifying, mitigating, and preventing insider threats. TSA addresses insider threat issues 
through a variety of security measures. These measures include the establishment of an 
agency-wide Insider Threat Working Group and Insider Threat Section responsible for 
developing an integrated agency-wide strategy to address these threats. TSA also 
performs insider threat vulnerability assessments and monitors information technology 
systems for indicators of insider threat behavior. Other measures include name-based 
vetting of all TSA, airline, airport, and airport vendor employees. Finally, TSA has also 
implemented an agency-wide training program to further employee awareness of this 
threat.6 
According to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), 
“(t)he solutions to countering adversarial threats often lie at the intersection of the CI and 
security disciplines.”7 The NCSC places “insider threat” in the middle of this 
intersection. CI refers to counterintelligence and is defined in §3001 of Title 50 of the 
United States Code as: 
                                                 
4 “Terror Plot BA Man Rajib Karim Gets 30 Years,” BBC News, March 18, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12788224.  
5 Katko, America’s Airports, 9.  
6 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 28–29.  
7 “How We Work,” accessed October 15, 2016, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we-work.  
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…information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, 
exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, 
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, 
organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist 
organizations or activities.8  
There is both an offensive and defensive aspect to insider threat programs, and 
identifying these measures and the difference between defensive (protection) and 
offensive (exploitation, deception, disruption)9 measures will help identify the most 
appropriate strategy to deal with insider threats within the domestic aviation system. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Primary research question: Is TSA’s current insider threat program successful at 
identifying and mitigating insider threats?  
Sub question: Does TSA require additional intelligence collection authorities to 
improve its ability to mitigate insider threats? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This review is an evaluation of the available literature concerning the problem 
space surrounding the insider threat issue as it relates to the domestic aviation system. It 
includes resources on security and CI programs commonly used to mitigate insider 
threats. Much of the reviewed literature is derived from government Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) reports regarding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the TSA as well as other aviation sector reports, Naval Postgraduate School theses, 
executive orders, press releases, and other professional journals. This thesis also reviews 
government websites in the United Kingdom to identify Military Intelligence Section 5’s 
(MI5’s) insider threat policies. For interpretation of legal justifications, I also reference § 
3001 of Title 50 of the United States Code, focusing on the set of laws authorizing 
specific government agencies to participate in “quintessential intelligence activities such 
                                                 
8 War and National Defense, U.S.C. Title 50 § 3001 (2011), 437.  
9 Ibid.  
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as intelligence collection and covert action.”10 When appropriate, this thesis covers open 
source media outlets are cited since some of the insider threat events more thoroughly in 
open sources. It is appropriate to separate this literature review into two categories: the 
types of insider threats and policies and methods for insider threat mitigation. 
1. What Are the Types of “Insider Threat?”    
The term “insider threat” can have different meanings depending on the context 
(and agency) in which it is used. For this literature review, the TSA definition serves as 
the primary characterization of the term “insider threat,” unless otherwise specified. As 
noted above, “TSA defines an insider threat as one or more individuals with access or 
insider knowledge that allows them to exploit the vulnerabilities of the nation’s 
transportation systems with the intent to cause harm.”11 More specifically, TSA identifies 
many types of insider threat activities, including spying, unauthorized and damaging 
releases of information, sabotage, corruption, theft, smuggling, impersonation, and 
terrorist attacks.12 Most of the literature uses a similar definition in terms of an insider 
threat’s access, but there are sharp differences in which category different agencies 
emphasize. This thesis discusses four primary areas of concern: an insider that divulges 
large amounts of electronic data; an insider that smuggles illicit materials onto an 
airplane; an insider stealing classified information on behalf of a foreign intelligence 
entity; and insiders seeking to leverage their access to facilitate or conduct a terrorist 
attack. 
The most current literature (2005 to present) tends to focus heavily on the first 
concern, the threat from an insider with access to sensitive electronic data. This is 
undoubtedly due to the theft and revelation of enormous amounts of classified 
information from government information technology systems by Edward Snowden and 
                                                 
10 Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas School of Law, 
2012).  
11 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 2.  
12 Ibid.  
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Bradley (Chelsea) Manning. U.S. government documents often are the best examples for 
elucidating this bias.  
In a statement to the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence in July of 2016, the then DHS Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis’ Undersecretary, Francis Taylor, described the DHS insider threat program 
as a “department-wide effort to protect classified national security information from 
unauthorized disclosure.”13 More specifically, “(t)he purpose of the program is to 
identify, detect, deter, and mitigate the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information.”14 In Frank Deffer’s report in 2012, he outlines the steps TSA has taken to 
address insider threats.15 The focus of this report is almost entirely on the vulnerability of 
TSA information technology systems to insider threats. Analysis of the organizational 
effectiveness at addressing this threat is commonplace in this arena of government OIG 
reports. Reports of this nature follow the format of identifying the issue, analyzing an 
organization’s programmatic structure to address the issue, providing an agency report 
card, and finally, providing recommendations for improvement. 
Literature specifically discussing insider threats to IT systems is not robust, and 
when discussed as part of a broader security concern, the literature is recent. Often, the 
information can be found in other theses and government reports and congressional 
testimony. The specifics on how an information technology insider can impact the 
aviation system are unexplored here. For example, could an insider cause enough 
confusion within an air traffic control system to result in a catastrophic loss of life and/or 
property? This topic appears to be a significant information gap in the literature. 
In contrast, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines “insider threat” as 
an individual with authorized access who steals information to sell and/or provide to a 
foreign government. It warns “(t)hat an insider may steal solely for personal gain, or that 
                                                 
13 Francis Taylor, Robert Hayes, and Rich McComb, Counterintelligence and Insider Threats: How 
Prepared Is the Department of Homeland Security? (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2016), 6.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration.  
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an insider may be a ‘spy’—someone who is stealing company information in order to 
benefit another organization or country.”16 Unlike DHS, the FBI’s focus with insider 
threats is the theft of sensitive technology and proprietary data to sell or benefit another 
organization or country. Most of the FBI literature describing its role in this field focuses 
on foreign intelligence services attempting to steal secrets.  
There is somewhat of a gap in the insider threat as a “terrorism issue” school of 
thought as well. The literature in this area is primarily from open sources and lacks the 
established government analysis and OIG evaluations as the other schools of thought (CI 
problem). Although less prevalent than criminal insider threats, a terrorist with insider 
access is uniquely positioned to cause catastrophic damage and loss of life within the 
aviation system.  
There are a few present-day examples of successful terrorist attacks involving 
insider threats in the aviation system since 2015. For instance, on February 2, 2016 in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, insiders working as airport security employees coordinated the 
passage of an explosive filled laptop through a security checkpoint x-ray machine. Soon 
after, the insiders passed the laptop to a passenger boarding Daallo Airlines flight 159, 
and he later detonated it onboard this flight. This attack was immediately claimed by al-
Shabaab, a terrorist group based in east Africa.17 Another example occurred on October 
31, 2016, when a bomb detonated on board Russian airliner Metrojet 9268, causing the 
plane to crash approximately 20 minutes after takeoff. Russian investigators believe a 
baggage loader loyal to the Egyptian offshoot of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIS) placed the bomb directly on the plane.18 Although these events took place 
internationally, both examples are indicative of the intent and capability of international 
terrorist groups which homegrown violent extremists in the United States have joined or 
                                                 
16 Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Insider Threat: An Introduction to Detecting and Deterring an 
Insider Spy [brochure] (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/insider_threat_brochure.pdf/view.  
17 Kylie Bull and Ben Vogel, “Daallo Airlines Bombing Investigation Focuses on Insider Threat,” IHS 
Jane’s 360, February 9, 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/57845/daallo-airlines-bombing-investigation-
focuses-on-insider-threat.  
18 Owen Mathews, “Metrojet Crash: Why The Insider Threat to Airport Security Isn’t Just Egypt’s 
Problem,” Newsweek, May 24, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/egyptair-metrojet-flight-
9268-airport-security-462784.html.  
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been inspired by. The vulnerability from a sympathetic insider presents a similar risk in 
the United States as it does overseas, regardless of security measures due to employees’ 
unique access and ability to circumvent security measures. 
Due to the recent nature of these events, they are not included in many theses 
related to aviation security or insider threats. However, a large amount of media from 
western newspapers and newsmagazines is available concerning these events and can be 
used to corroborate information to paint an accurate picture of these events. For example, 
these incidents are all covered in depth by the BBC News, CNN, Washington Post, New 
York Times, and other such publications.  
The literature discussing criminal insider threats to the domestic aviation system 
is significantly more robust than the literature describing insider threats tied to terrorism. 
Sources describing incidents of criminal activity involving insider threats are plentiful in 
both open source reports as well as journal articles, but government reports are less 
available. However, one could argue that an insider with motive, means, and opportunity 
for terrorist pursuits would take advantage of the same vulnerabilities as exploited by 
criminals.  
Criminal activity can be separated out into many different categories, such as 
trespass, theft, drug trafficking, human smuggling, weapons smuggling, etc. In one of the 
more prominent examples, in March 2007, two airline employees trafficked 14 guns and 
“eight pounds of marijuana on board a commercial airplane at Orlando International 
Airport”19 in Florida. Another critical event leading to significant changes in TSA’s 
screening procedures for airport employees is the previously mentioned gun smuggling 
ring involving Mark Quentin Henry in 2014.20 This event led to multiple congressional 
inquiries and industry recommendations.  
                                                 
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other Actions 
Would Strengthen TSA’s Efforts to Secure Commercial Perimeters and Access Controls (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 2.  
20 Joe Sharkey, “Gun Smuggling on Plane Reveals Security Oversight,” The New York Times, 
December 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/business/gun-smuggling-on-plane-reveals-
security-oversight.html?_r=0.  
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In contrast, the government of the United Kingdom strikes a different tone when 
discussing insider threats. Its overall focus is more about establishing a sound policy and 
model than on the specifics of what an insider threat is (terrorist, criminal, spy, etc.). For 
example, the United Kingdom’s official government agency website on this issue 
identifies the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), part of MI5, as the 
“government authority for protective security advice to the United Kingdom national 
infrastructure.”21 Links on the page include United Kingdom CPNI studies on the data 
pertaining to what factors motivate insider threats instead of their end goal. In short, the 
emphasis is behavior-focused and attempts to create a profile for different types of insider 
threats. According to CPNI, there are five chief types of insider threat behaviors: 
unauthorized revelation of information, process corruption, the enabling of outside entity 
access, physical sabotage, and electronic interference.22 This contrasts with the OIG and 
U.S. government documents that tend to focus more on the individual’s end game (intent) 
as the main threat instead of potential avenues for the illicit activity. 
2. Policies and Methods for Insider Threat Mitigation 
In Frank Deffer’s OIG report, Transportation Security Administration Has Taken 
Steps to Address the Insider Threat but Challenges Remain, he discusses this issue from a 
policy and procedures viewpoint. Deffer analyzes TSA’s internal structure to address and 
investigate insider threats, and he suggests TSA still needs to increase its ability to 
centrally monitor all information systems to better detect an attempt by an insider to 
illicitly extract large amounts of data onto removable media devices.23 The 2008 OIG 
report titled TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando 
International Airport and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening takes a 
slightly different view. This report argues that 100 percent screening of employees in the 
                                                 
21 “About CPNI,” Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, accessed October 15, 2017, 
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/about-cpni.  
22 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure [CPNI], CPNI Insider Data Collection Study: 
Report of Main Findings (London: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2013).  
23 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 13.  
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sterile area (past checkpoint screening) is unfeasible due to resource constraints and the 
burden placed on these employees.24 
Another argument explored by a 2012 OIG report is found in Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of TSA’s Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Program (VIPR) 
within Rail and Mass Transit Systems. Although the title indicates otherwise, this article 
discusses using TSA high visibility operations in the sterile area of the airport as a 
method to deter insider threats. This operation includes multiple TSA employees, often 
including armed federal air marshals, conducting high visibility security procedures in a 
random and unpredictable manner.25 This represents a dissenting opinion in the literature 
already and argues for a proactive, visible deterrent as an excellent means for mitigating 
insider threats. The Deffer OIG report, on the other hand, argues for a more robust 
information technology monitoring capability that is essentially a passive, defensive 
security measure.  
Others believe the best solution to mitigating the insider threat is in the employee 
background check process conducted by each airport. In his 2010 Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis entitled “Managing the Aviation Insider Threat,” Alan Black recommends 
airports further leverage and enhance the background check of a prospective employee. 
He argues for more frequent criminal records checks and criminal prosecution for those 
that do not self-report a conviction within 24 hours (as is required by law). Moreover, he 
would like to see this taken a step further and require self-reporting of arrests.26 Although 
Black argues for putting “more teeth” into the vetting process, he is still advocating for 
more aggressive defensive measures. In this case, the defensive measure is reliant upon 
the cooperation of employees to report information that might be detrimental to their 
employment. Even more far-fetched is the idea that insiders with nefarious intent would 
provide self-reporting and derail their own plot. 
                                                 
24 War and National Defense, U.S.C. Title 50 § 3001 (2011).  
25 Charles K. Edwards, Efficiency and Effectiveness of TSA’s Visible Intermodel Prevention and 
Response Program Within Rail and Mass Transit Systems (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, 2012).  
26 Alan Black, “Managing the Aviation Insider Threat” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010).  
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Lockheed Martin identifies defensive measures within its insider threat program 
but also advocates for a much more proactive CI approach to the problem. Its Director of 
CI Operations and Investigations, Douglas Thomas, considers the entire spectrum of 
defensive and offensive insider threat mitigation measures to fall under the CI umbrella, 
and the company manages each of these measures by a cadre of experience CI 
professionals.27 He argues against profiling as a mitigation measure and uses “red team” 
exercises designed to test defensive measures. This is in stark contrast to the United 
Kingdom, in which its lead agency, CPNI (under MI5’s hierarchy), advocates for using 
various profiling and behavioral analysis measures to detect insider threats.28  
There are some advocates for a more holistic approach to the issue as well. 
Lockheed Martin and CPNI both advise for robust measures at the pre-employment 
screening stage up until the employee leaves the company or agency. According to CPNI, 
“Using robust and on-going protective security measures and establishing effective 
management practices is key to reducing vulnerability.”29 It identifies good management 
practices as a critical element of creating a loyal and committed workforce and 
minimizing feelings of disgruntlement.30 This emphasis on management’s role does not 
appear in the literature describing TSA’s insider threat programs or in the various OIG 
reports’ recommendations. 
Another counterargument to passive insider threat detection (waiting for 
malicious activity to occur) is for organizations to use behavior modeling. Sources 
advocating for this approach were mostly published between 2003–2010. This approach 
argues illicit insiders are a “people” problem and countermeasures should emphasize 
profiling and discovering irregularities in employee behavior. According to Puleo in a 
2006 paper, “The new risk-based model focuses on observable influences that affect 
                                                 
27 Douglas D. Thomas and Harvey Rishikof, “Counterintelligence and Insider Threat Detection” 
(presentation for Government Contractors Forum, Security Clearance and Insider Threat Boot Camp, 
February 2016), http://m.acc.com/chapters/ncr/upload/Session-2-Insider_Threat_Program_ 
Panel2_020916.pdf.  
28 “About CPNI,” Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure.  
29 CPNI, CPNI Insider Data Collection, 15.  
30 Ibid., 15.  
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employees and identifies employees with increased risk of becoming malicious 
insiders.”31 Although the most recent literature indicates TSA has shied away from using 
a behavior modeling strategy, this approach does represent a proactive approach to 
identifying employees with possible malicious intent and has value in the broader debate. 
CPNI also favors the behavior modeling approach to insider threat mitigation. It has 
identified four behaviors of interest when frequent behavior trends are noted without an 
adequate explanation: engaging in unusual copying activity, unusual information 
technology activity, unauthorized handling of sensitive material, and committing security 
violations.32 
3. Conclusion from the Literature 
The literature discussing insider threats to the aviation system has significant gaps 
and is somewhat disjointed. In addition to some of the holes identified in the body of this 
literature review, there is also very little legal analysis on what measures TSA can or 
cannot additionally implement to more aggressively mitigate the insider threat. It is 
unclear at this point if this is solely due to a lack of literature, a lack of urgency, or a lack 
of overall concern. On the other hand, OIG and GAO reports provide an excellent 
backbone of credible material discussing TSA current programs to mitigate insider 
threats. These materials focus primarily on employee vetting against terrorism databases 
as well as information technology monitoring to detect suspicious activity.  
Another key gap in the literature appears to be the discussion on rights and 
authorities for more aggressive law enforcement or intelligence collection measures 
within TSA to counter the insider threat. This seems to be a largely unexplored topic, and 
it is not clear if this is due to a lack of granted authority to conduct such activities or a 
lack of attempt to do so by a relatively new federal agency such as TSA. It appears this is 
a question that will force an answer soon as the threat will drive agency action. Perhaps 
the solution is for the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to assume this 
                                                 
31 Anthony J. Puleo, “Mitigating Insider Threat Using Human Behavior Influence Models” (master’s 
thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006).  
32 CPNI, CPNI Insider Data Collection, 12.  
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responsibility over the aviation system as a Title 50 organization with CI and intelligence 
collection authority. Maybe current authorities assigned to TSA can be interpreted to 
allow TSA to develop more intrusive offensive collection measures to identify insider 
threats. These are research questions worth exploring further and represent a knowledge 
gap in the available literature. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes a policy options analysis framework to identify the current 
policies within TSA for mitigating insider threats, shortcomings of TSA’s current 
policies, and policy recommendations for improving TSA’s ability to counter these 
threats. For the purpose of identifying alternative solutions, it is important to compare 
how other government agencies and companies mitigate insider threats. I compare the 
insider threat policies of the FBI, DHS I&A, Lockheed Martin, and MI5/CPNI (United 
Kingdom). 
This thesis explores the applicability, legality, and effectiveness for TSA to 
conduct more intrusive, offensive CI collection. CI has traditionally been directed at 
foreign intelligence entities, but could it also be directed at mitigating a drug smuggler 
working for a domestic airline? The FBI has an established domestic CI mission and law 
enforcement function, and as the lead domestic CI agency its policies for addressing 
insider threat provide an excellent analytical comparison as well.33 Comparing the 
policies and authorities used by other entities to conduct CI operations is useful in 
determining the best policy recommendations for TSA.   
Inevitably, some of the more intrusive measures require an analysis of whether 
TSA can legally conduct certain operations, especially when U.S. persons (citizens or 
lawful permanent residents) are involved. Since most offensive measures are CI 
collection operations, it is prudent to consider if TSA can legally conduct such 
operations, and, if not, what additional authority it would require. 
                                                 
33 War and National Defense, U.S.C. Title 50 § 3001 (2011), 435.  
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next chapter of this thesis is a description of TSA’s current insider threat 
mitigation policy and an analysis of the effectiveness of TSA’s insider threat program. To 
provide alternative policy options, Chapter III describes the insider threat policies of the 
FBI, I&A, Lockheed Martin, and the United Kingdom’s MI5/ CPNI. Chapter IV 
compares and analyzes the insider threat policies of these entities and discusses various 
courses of action TSA can consider adapting to improve its insider threat programs. The 
last chapter provides final policy recommendations for TSA to improve its insider threat 
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II. THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S 
INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM  
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have 
characterized the threat of rogue aviation workers, who exploit their 
credentials, access, and knowledge of airport security procedures for 
personal gain or to inflict damage—referred to as the insider threat—as 
one of aviation security’s most pressing concerns.34 
A. INTRODUCTION 
TSA plays a critical role in the everyday lives of Americans as the federal agency 
primarily responsible for ensuring the freedom of movement for both people and 
commerce on the homeland’s transportation systems. TSA was created in November 
2001 when Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 
(ATSA). The ATSA assigned TSA responsibility for security in all modes of 
transportation, including aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway, freight rail, and 
pipeline. The transportation sector is often privately owned, and therefore TSA 
collaborates with industry and other levels of government to assist these entities in 
securing their systems.35 In the aviation sector, TSA screens passengers, baggage, and 
cargo to prevent acts of terrorism.36 The ATSA also charges TSA with improving airport 
perimeter and access control to the secured areas of airports while reducing the security 
risks posed by workers at these airports.37  
This chapter discusses the scope of the insider threat within the domestic aviation 
system and TSA’s current policies and methods for mitigating this threat. TSA is 
primarily playing defense with its insider threat mitigation methods, and it operates 
within the framework of protective security programs. Security programs are designed to 
                                                 
34 Jennifer A. Grover, Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would 
Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2016).   
35 “TSA Mission,” Transportation Security Administration, accessed April 29, 2017, 
https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission.  
36 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 2.  
37 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security.  
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protect against unauthorized access, both physical and virtual. As a metric for success, 
prevention is difficult to measure. However, this chapter reviews and analyzes insider 
threat cases within the domestic aviation system that current TSA security programs 
failed to prevent or identify. The conclusion of this chapter addresses the overall success 
of TSA’s insider threat program. It also considers whether TSA should adopt offensive 
insider threat mitigation measures. More specifically, is there a role for CI in TSA’s 
insider threat program? 
B. SCOPE OF THE INSIDER THREAT ISSUE WITHIN THE DOMESTIC 
AVIATION SYSTEM 
According to an Airports Council International of North America study, about 1.2 
million people work at 485 commercial airports in the United States.38 Numbers from 
TSA in 2015 indicate approximately 440 of these airports are federalized. A 2017 House 
Homeland Security Committee report cites approximately 900,000 aviation workers at 
approximately 450 federalized airports.39 A federalized airport must meet specified 
regulatory requirements and TSA standards for security, screening, and access control.40 
Although there is some fluctuation in numbers, it is reasonable to consider there are 
approximately one million aviation workers comprising the potential of an insider threat.   
In the aviation environment, possible insider threats include TSA employees, 
airline workers, airport vendors, and airport contractors with access to areas restricted to 
the public. This cadre of airline workers, airport workers, airport vendors, and contractors 
are collectively referred to as “aviation workers” by TSA. Many of these aviation 
workers are granted secure identification display area (SIDA) badges giving them 
physical access to many of the most sensitive areas of an airport, including planes on the 
runway and passenger baggage transiting areas.41 TSA employees alone account for over 
50,000 aviation workers nationwide with access to sensitive areas and information at 
                                                 
38 Harriet Baskas, “How Many People Does It Take to Run an Airport?,” USA Today, March 30, 2016, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2016/03/30/airport-workers-employees/82385558/.  
39 Katko, America’s Airports, 2.  
40 Grover, Aviation Security, 8.  
41 John Roth, TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (OIG-15-98) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2015), 8.  
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domestic airports. Herein lies the potential of insider threat within the aviation system 
from both TSA employees and other aviation workers. Trusted insiders are usually 
familiar with weaknesses in internal policies and procedures, physical security code 
procedures, and information technology systems.42  
A 2017 House Homeland Security Committee majority staff report on insider 
threats within American airports revealed Congress remains concerned that insider threats 
in the aviation system are rising.43 TSA and the FBI agree insider threats represent one of 
aviation security’s “most pressing concerns.”44 These agencies have identified access 
controls to sensitive areas at airports as a significant source of vulnerability within the 
aviation system. In terms of employee and aviation worker vetting, TSA has significant 
gaps in the data sets it has been granted access to by the U.S. Intelligence Community 
(IC). This recently resulted in 73 aviation workers, all with jobs requiring some degree of 
sensitive area airport access, passing TSA vetting checks even though the IC had 
identified them as having possible ties to terrorism.45  
C. TSA’S CURRENT INSIDER THREAT POLICIES 
TSA has implemented steps to address insider threats, both within its workforce 
and the broader aviation worker population it is responsible for vetting. As TSA began 
seriously re-examining insider threat issues back in December 2008, the TSA Office of 
Inspection began to develop and facilitate an insider threat program. It established an 
internal Insider Threat Task Force to implement an education and awareness campaign 
for both TSA employees and aviation stakeholders.46 
However, the problem has continued to be a major issue for the agency and 
industry. TSA focuses its efforts on two fundamental areas when it comes to preventing 
an insider threat who poses a threat from acting. First, how can TSA best conduct 
                                                 
42 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 4.  
43 Katko, America’s Airports, 2.  
44 Grover, Aviation Security, 22.  
45 Katko, America’s Airports, 3–5, 10.  
46 Deffer, Transportation Security Administration, 5.  
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background checks (commonly referred to as “vetting”) on an initial and continuing basis 
to prevent known or suspected terrorists and persons with disqualifying criminal records 
from gaining insider access? Second, how can TSA regulate and enforce access control to 
prevent insiders who pose threats from using their employee access to further nefarious 
activity? 
TSA’s current vetting requirements and authority are stipulated in Chapter 49 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. This requires aviation workers “applying for credentials 
to work in secure areas of commercial airports undergo background checks prior to being 
granted badges that allow them unescorted access to secure areas.”47 The background 
check must include the following: 
1. A security threat assessment on the individual from TSA (including 
database checks for ties to terrorism). 
2. Fingerprint-based criminal history records check.   
3. Evidence the applicant has a right to work in the United States.48 
In a 2015 DHS OIG report TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting, the OIG 
determined TSA does a generally effective job of employing controls for vetting aviation 
workers and coordinating results with the FBI and National Counterterrorism Center.49  
However, these measures are only effective at identifying individuals associated with 
terrorism that we know about already. This is a key distinction in today’s threat 
environment in which the inspired lone wolf or homegrown violent extremist is an 
unknown individual committing a terrorist act.   
The DHS OIG also “determined that TSA had multiple, layered controls for 
vetting workers for terrorism.”50 TSA’s vetting procedures check aviation workers 
“against the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist within minutes of receiving updated 
watchlist data”51 for individual aviation workers. When new aviation workers are 
                                                 
47 Roth, TSA Can Improve, 4.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., 2.  
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employed, they are immediately vetted against this watchlist, and when there is an update 
(often these are additions) to watchlist data, nearly one million existing credentialed 
aviation workers are re-vetted within minutes.52 This ensures new aviation workers are 
not currently on the watchlist and if any current aviation workers later added to the 
watchlist, they are promptly identified as such. 
However, the DHS OIG found TSA has significantly less effective controls for 
ensuring airports “have a robust verification process over a credential applicant’s 
criminal history and authorization to work in the United States.”53 TSA does not perform 
recurrent criminal records vetting (akin to the recurrent vetting checks for terrorism 
watchlist records) and airport operators are left to verify criminal histories for 
disqualifying offenses at the time aviation workers become employed at the airport. Per 
49 CFR § 1542.209(e), aviation workers are responsible for self-reporting convictions 
within 24 hours to the airport operator that issued the secure area access badge.54 
Needless to say, there is a serious conflict of interest for aviation workers to report their 
own disqualifying offenses once employed as this will likely lead to their loss of 
employment.55   
TSA is expanding its use of the FBI Rapback program in aviation worker vetting. 
This program provides 24/7 vetting of aviation workers and notifies the employing entity 
of new arrests and other criminal activity that might disqualify them from maintaining 
their sensitive area access.56 Although TSA’s vetting program is effective at identifying 
watch-listed individuals (known or suspected terrorists) who become known while they 
are employed, airport operators have long complained of the absence of such a program 
when it comes to criminal records, which also could be used to determine if an employee 
is an insider threat to the aviation system.  
                                                 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Black, “Managing the Aviation Insider Threat,” 35.  
55 Roth, TSA Can Improve.  
56 Katko, America’s Airports, 14.  
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Many members of Congress recommend that TSA should physically screen 100 
percent of aviation workers entering the sterile areas of an airport in order to deter (or 
identify) an insider threat.57 In 2007, Congress introduced two bills pursuing the 100 
percent aviation worker screening requirement,58 but neither bill was passed by both 
bodies of Congress.59 After the Atlanta gun smuggling incident in 2014 (mentioned 
above), there were renewed calls for TSA to conduct 100 percent physical screening for 
aviation workers. However, the concept was widely rejected by both TSA and the 
aviation industry as generally ineffective. In a 2015 Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee report, the aviation industry concluded that 100 percent screening did not 
represent a “silver bullet” and that other more cost effective actions, such as random 
employee screening, and expanded domestic intelligence collection measures like social 
media account monitoring, could have a similar effect.60 Kathleen Rice (D-New York), a 
ranking member of the Transportation Security Committee, similarly advocates that all 
aviation workers should come to work with the expectation they will be physically 
screened that day; however, she acknowledges that 100 percent aviation worker screening 
might not be the only solution.61 The plausible expectation of physical screening of the 
aviation workers and their bags or other items at any time when entering a secured area is 
considered a critical layer in a multi-layered approach to mitigating insider threats.62   
TSA has resisted adopting a 100 percent aviation worker screening footprint as it 
is both resource intensive for TSA and time intensive for aviation workers to submit to 
                                                 
57 Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Final Report of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee’s 
Working Group on Airport Access Control (Arlington, VA: Aviation Security Advisory Committee, 2015), 
2, 7.  
58 Richard L. Skinner, TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International 
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60 Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Final Report, 2–4.  
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daily physical screening. As a result, TSA prefers a policy of targeted, random screening 
measures for aviation workers. This approach has generally been supported by the 
aviation industry.63 Unpredictable and random aviation worker screening measures at 
prearranged employee entrances can be an effective deterrent if executed appropriately. 
To be effective, random aviation worker screening resources need to be allocated to cover 
all employee access points within a specific area and time to prevent aviation workers 
from entering the secure area through another entrance.64  
Unfortunately, this has been identified as a weak point in TSA’s random 
screening measures. According to a 2015 Aviation Security Advisory Committee report, 
“Static security measures, such as physical screening, can be studied, tested, and more 
easily circumvented than those that are dynamic and less predictable.”65 After all, a 
random employee screening checkpoint can be rendered ineffective if another employee 
entrance to the secured access area is available without screening. An insider threat could 
merely bypass the random employee screening checkpoint and proceed through a 
different entrance. As a counter measure, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 
recommends in 2015 that airport and aircraft operators selectively close adjacent access 
points during TSA’s random screening operations in the secured areas to help funnel 
aviation workers to TSA’s random physical screening checkpoints.66  
TSA has also taken a number of steps to detect and mitigate insider threats from 
TSA employees seeking to use their legitimate access to information technology systems 
to further nefarious insider activities. TSA processes classified and sensitive information 
on its various information technology systems, and this information could be useful to a 
foreign government, terrorist group, or criminal enterprise. In the spirit of the creation of 
national level Insider Threat Task Forces and working groups (mandated by Executive 
Order [E.O.] 13587), TSA has also established the internal Insider Threat Working Group 
and Insider Threat Unit to implement multiple insider threat reporting and identification 
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programs. The Insider Threat Unit is run by the agency’s Office of Law Enforcement 
(comprised of federal air marshals and collaborates with both “state and federal partners 
to actively monitor criminal activity within airports.”67 According to 2016 testimony 
from Darby LaJoye, TSA Deputy Assistant Administrator, the Insider Threat Unit’s 
efforts have resulted in several arrests.68 Vulnerability assessments and integrity checks 
are also conducted regularly on TSA information technology systems along with a 
security operations center that monitors the daily activity and security of TSA 
information technology systems.69    
TSA has also utilizes a much-scrutinized program over the years called the 
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) team to counter insider threats from 
aviation workers through visible deterrence and unpredictable aviation worker random 
screening checkpoints.70 VIPR teams are comprised of federal air marshals, local law 
enforcement officers, behavior detection officers, explosives detection canine teams, 
explosives specialists, regulatory inspectors, and transportation security officers or any 
combination thereof. The original purpose of a VIPR team was to be an unpredictable 
and visible presence at various transportation modes as a deterrent to terrorist activity. 
These operations can be considered a more aggressive form of random aviation worker 
screening operations coupled with a visible law enforcement presence and other TSA 
security assets. Questions have arisen, however, regarding the program’s security value to 
the transportation industry. 
D. SHORTCOMINGS AND SUCCESSES OF TSA’S INSIDER THREAT 
POLICY 
In recent years, several incidents have made it clear the insider threat in the 
aviation system is a significant problem, and represents a major vulnerability to both 
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criminals and terrorists. Criminal activity involving aviation workers has been a regular 
occurrence. The gun smuggling ring in 2014 in Atlanta (mentioned in Chapter I) is just 
one example of an insider event in which multiple airline employees were involved in a 
sophisticated gun smuggling ring. Orlando International Airport had a similar case back 
in 2007 when two Comair Airline employees were caught attempting to smuggle eight 
pounds of marijuana and fourteen firearms onto a Delta Air Lines commercial flight to 
Puerto Rico.71 
TSA has also experienced a few employees and TSA contractors who have used 
their insider access for criminal activity. In February of 2017, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the District of Puerto Rico indicted 12 persons charged with “conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute” cocaine. The cocaine was smuggled through the TSA security 
system at Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Six current 
and former TSA employees are included among the 12 people indicted. These employees 
were transportation security officers who screened both checked and carry-on luggage. 
The indictment alleges the TSOs cleared luggage filled with cocaine through the X-ray 
screening machines while another aviation worker safeguarded the bags until they were 
smuggled onboard an aircraft, thus avoiding any canine or law enforcement patrols.72  
In another example, at San Francisco International Airport, two TSA security 
screeners were arrested in 2015 for smuggling methamphetamine through the airport. 
Both screeners were contractors working as transportation security officers and are 
alleged to have purposely overlooked pre-specified packages and bags at the security 
checkpoints in exchange for monetary bribes.73 In conjunction with the gun smuggling 
operations in Atlanta and Orlando, these examples demonstrate that TSA, despite federal 
background checks and vetting, is susceptible to insider threats within its organization.  
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Unfortunately, there have also been multiple incidents involving known or 
suspected terrorists and their very troubling prior employment as aviation workers at 
domestic airports before their involvement with terrorist attacks overseas. These events 
have shined a particularly bright spotlight on the Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
Airport in Minnesota. In October of 2008, Shirwa Ahmed became the first known suicide 
bomber from the United States to join al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization in Somalia 
aligned with al-Qaida. Ahmed was an airport cart driver at Minneapolis-St. Paul 
International Airport before leaving for Somalia to join al-Shabaab.74 Although this 
incident took place prior to TSA’s 2008 revamp of its insider threat programs, it is 
noteworthy to point out that TSA’s insider threat program has continued to have 
difficulty with identifying radicalized individuals. Another suicide bomber who once 
worked at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport was killed fighting for al-Shabaab 
in Somalia in October of 2011. Abdisalan Hussein Ali, another radicalized aviation 
worker, served coffee in the airport across from a Customs and Border Protection 
checkpoint before heading overseas to fight for al-Shabaab.75 Additionally, in November 
of 2014, three more men who once worked at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport 
were recruited to fight for ISIS in Syria and Iraq. One of these three men, Abdirahmaan 
Muhumed, cleaned the interior of arriving planes and refueled them on the ramp. He had 
a SIDA badge granting him direct access to airplanes on the runway.76  
It is important to note these terrorists did not conduct attacks during their 
employment at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. However, it is concerning 
that they were radicalized or in the process of being radicalized while they were aviation 
workers with SIDA access. None of the security measures (primarily vetting) identified 
these aviation workers as either known or suspected terrorists. This is even more 
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concerning today as ISIS has encouraged radicalized individuals to conduct attacks 
abroad as the group loses territory in Syria and Iraq.77 
Also alarming is that just a year later, in December of 2015, Moniteveti Katoa, an 
aviation worker at Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport in Texas, told an undercover 
FBI agent he could smuggle explosives onboard an aircraft for a $4,000 fee.78 Katoa led a 
group of three other aviation workers in a cocaine smuggling operation prior to his arrest. 
His willingness to smuggle explosives is a foreboding example of the seriousness the 
insider threat vulnerability poses to the aviation system.79 Whether motivated by 
ideology or profit, terrorists and criminals have been able to gain employment within the 
domestic aviation system. Although Katoa was eventually discovered and arrested, one 
could argue TSA’s insider threat program failed to prevent Katoa from leading a small 
cocaine smuggling ring; however, it can be considered a success that Katoa was 
eventually identified and arrested by the FBI.  
In testimony to Congress in February of 2016, TSA stated, “that recent insider 
threat mitigation efforts have yielded arrests in Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco and 
Puerto Rico.”80 These arrests have been linked to coordination and referrals by the TSA 
Insider Threat Unit to other federal law enforcement agencies.81 Specific details on the 
TSA Insider Threat Unit’s role in the arrests are not publicly available, and one can 
assume this is to protect the sources and methods by which the insider threats are 
identified. 
It is clear, however, that TSA’s employee and aviation worker vetting programs 
have not been able to identify a number of insider threats. A major part of the problem is 
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these security programs are defensive in nature with a heavy emphasis on initial and 
recurrent vetting. These programs are used to identify known or suspected terrorists or 
persons with disqualifying criminal records prior to or during their employment with 
TSA or as aviation workers. The weakness in these programs is they can only identify 
known criminals and known or suspected terrorists after they have already come in 
contact with law enforcement or intelligence personnel. In other words, these are all 
persons we know about and can perform an individual threat assessment on to determine 
their level of risk to the aviation system. Nevertheless, the insiders who pose successful 
threats is the one that TSA did not know about prior to their employment, and their 
criminal or terrorist activity remains undetected during their employment.  
The gap in the system is that despite pre- and post-employment vetting, some 
insider threats are not being detected during the planning stages of their nefarious 
activity. It is worth considering if more can be done to detect radicalized or criminal 
insiders before they have a chance to act, but the challenge remains detecting individual 
intent. This is not a new problem and many U.S. government agencies have tried various 
methods to fill in this gap and identify insiders who pose threats before they can cause 
too much damage. There are a wide range of options to consider such as organizational 
cultural changes, clandestine source operations, domestic intelligence collection, and 
even polygraph exams. 
E. SHOULD TSA ADOPT OFFENSIVE INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION 
MEASURES? 
The National Insider Threat Policy requires all federal executive branch agencies 
to “establish a program for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threat; leveraging 
CI, security, information assurance, and other relevant functions and resources to identify 
and counter the insider threat.”82 When applied to the TSA operating space under the 
Title 50 definition, CI can be described as actions taken to protect against espionage, 
sabotage, and international terrorism activities.83 
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CI is inherently an offensive measure when compared to security programs. It is 
often clandestine activity conducted for national “security purposes against a target 
having suspected or known affiliation”84 with a foreign intelligence entity or international 
terrorism. Some of the more aggressive CI measures include double agent operations and 
controlled source operations with the intent to collect intelligence on a target. There are 
also less intrusive CI measures, such as technical surveillance countermeasures and 
employee polygraphs, which are designed to protect an agency’s resources from 
collection or exploitation by a foreign intelligence service.85   
The difference between security and CI is nuanced but critical to distinguish. 
Stated simply, CI is not security. Security only protects, but as an offensive tool, CI 
attacks and goes beyond the defensive nature of security. Security functions include 
physical (facility and personnel) protection, personnel background checks/investigations, 
information technology systems security, document control, education, and awareness 
training. The main threat concern with security is unauthorized access. In contrast, the 
main threat concern with CI is clandestine and covert threats. Insiders posing threats span 
the spectrum of CI and security because they utilize clandestine and covert action while 
capitalizing on employee access to get around physical and virtual access controls.86 In 
fact, insiders often bypass the security disciplines because they have authorized access to 
sensitive areas and systems by nature of their employment.  
TSA does not make any claim concerning the conduct of CI operations, and there 
is no description of a CI program in any of the most recent GAO, DHS OIG reports, or on 
the TSA.gov webpage. Keeping the above definitions in mind, it is apparent TSA’s 
insider threat program relies on a variety of security programs focused primarily on 
employee/aviation worker background checks (vetting), physical security of personnel 
and facilities, and information technology system security. However, some of the tactics 
discussed in this section have a successful track record for detecting insider threats and 
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could be adopted by TSA to improve its ability to detect insider threats in the aviation 
system. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed TSA’s current policy for insider threat mitigation and 
the security programs used by TSA for this purpose. There have been some successes, but 
also some very troubling incidents involving insiders have occurred nonetheless. This 
chapter has also described several recent examples of insider threat cases and possible 
actors and that none of these individuals were identified as possible insider threats by 
TSA security programs. Clearly, identifying more aggressive measures could help TSA 
identify insider threats in the aviation system.  
It is worth considering whether TSA should cross the threshold between security 
and CI and add a CI program to its current insider threat measures. In the words of 
arguably the most damaging American working as a spy for the Soviet Union, Robert 
Hanssen, “CI attacks the actor. It attacks the opposition intelligence structure. It is not 
speculative. CI feeds security because it helps them focus on meaningful measures and 
safeguards. Using CI to help security is just smart security.”87  
Chapter III discusses the insider threat policies and mitigation measures used by 
other entities that are responsible for addressing their own insider threat concerns. Some 
of these agencies, like the DHS I&A, have relatively new insider threat and CI programs. 
Others, such as the FBI, have robust programs and an established track record. The next 
chapter also looks at the policies used by the United Kingdom’s MI5 as well as the 
program run by Lockheed Martin, a private defense contractor with substantial concerns 
for insider threat. Modeling and analyzing the insider threat programs of these entities 
can help identify a broad range of practices to help to determine what other measures 
TSA could consider implementing to improve its insider threat programs. 
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III. RAISING THE SHIELD (OR SWORD): HOW DO 
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS PROTECT THEMSELVES 
FROM INSIDER THREATS? 
This chapter identifies and discusses the insider threat programs of four different 
organizations: DHS I&A, FBI, CPNI, and Lockheed Martin. These organizations 
represent a diverse mission set with significant concerns for insider threats. Exploring the 
practices of other organizations should inform us on the best recommendations to 
improve TSA’s insider threat program. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF 
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS 
DHS I&A official mission is “to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the 
timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the Homeland safe, secure, and 
resilient.”88 I&A is tasked to ensure intelligence information from the 15 DHS 
component agencies is fused and analyzed to provide a common operational picture for 
the entire department.89 DHS I&A has an interesting role within the DHS Intelligence 
Enterprise (IE) as both its own organization with Title 50 IC authority and the synergy 
point for the DHS IE. Part of this task includes the responsibility to coordinate 
intelligence analysis efforts across the six IE components within DHS that perform an 
intelligence mission. I&A is focused on five primary areas for intelligence production: 
border security, narcotics trafficking, alien and human smuggling, money laundering, and 
radicalization or extremism.90  
Simultaneously, the head of I&A, also known as the DHS chief intelligence 
officer, serves as the primary connective tissue between DHS and the other federal 
agencies making up the IC. One of the chief intelligence officer’s key responsibilities is 
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to establish the intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and production priorities 
amongst members of the DHS IE.91 In a sense, the DHS IE seeks to create the same 
intended synergy found among IC agencies but with focus on supporting the overall DHS 
and component agency missions. The former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael 
Chertoff, also tasked I&A to be the primary source of intelligence information from the 
IC to state, local, and private sector partners.92  
Title 50 is widely known as a portion of the U.S. Code containing multiple 
statutes relating to national security and foreign affairs. It is commonly used to grant 
intelligence collection and covert operations authorities to members of the IC. Of the six 
DHS IE components, only I&A and the U.S. Coast Guard are Title 50 agencies and are 
specifically identified as such in Title 50 U.S.C. § 3001.93 This not only grants them 
authorities to collect information but also to protect the security and methods surrounding 
these collection activities (CI). This includes the ability to investigate the applicants, 
employees, and contractors associated with the IC as well as the physical protection of 
installations and the protection of virtual information.94 Many of these activities are often 
considered part of an agency’s CI mission in conjunction with an agency’s security 
programs. Typically, CI collection within the United States is the responsibility of the 
FBI when targeting foreign intelligence elements. Other members of the IC are 
authorized to collect CI information concerning present and former employees or 
contractors only.95 
Similar to TSA, DHS does not place all of its resources to counter insider threats 
into one office or function. The next section focuses on I&A’s insider threat mitigation 
programs since DHS is moving towards expanding its CI program specifically for this 
effort. However, other security programs operated outside of I&A (but still within DHS) 
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will also be discussed as they play a significant role in the overall insider threat 
mitigation effort as well. 
1. Scope and Current Policy 
There are currently over 115,000 employees within I&A and the DHS component 
agencies that currently hold security clearances and positions that could be intelligence 
collection targets by adversary groups.96 DHS defines insider threat as “the threat that an 
insider will use his or her authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the 
security of the United States.”97 From the DHS purview, insiders who pose threats are 
capable of damaging the United States through “espionage, terrorism, unauthorized 
disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of 
departmental resources or capabilities.”98  
DHS operates its internal Insider Threat Program primarily designed to 
complement the department’s CI and security missions.99 DHS established the insider 
threat program after the issuance of Executive Order 13587 in 2011. Its goals are: 
To prevent the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security 
information, deter cleared employees from becoming insider threats, 
detect employees who pose a risk to classified national security 
information, and mitigate risks to the security of classified national 
security information through administrative, investigative, or other 
actions, while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of 
cleared personnel.100 
The DHS chief security officer is responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
insider threat program, thus placing the operational control of the program outside DHS’s 
CI Division. 
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In essence, the insider threat program protects against insider threats with security 
measures, such as information technology systems access controls and monitoring.101 Its 
goals are indicative of DHS’s concentration on identifying threats to classified 
information and data. To prevent unauthorized disclosure (witting and unwittingly), DHS 
collects and analyzes data about DHS employees102 with security clearances, DHS 
stakeholders (public and private sectors) with security clearances, and others with a 
security clearance and access to DHS information technology systems or classified 
information.103 DHS identifies possible insider threats by analyzing this data for 
indicators like unauthorized data transfers to mobile storage devices. Even more 
specifically, the insider threat program is designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information by collecting data from information technology system monitoring 
and tips from other cleared individuals (such as coworkers).104  
Unique to DHS’s insider threat program is its written emphasis on protecting the 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of its employees.105 For the legal authority to 
collect information on its employees and contractors, DHS cites multiple sources. For 
example, DHS cites both E.O. 12333 and Title 50 U.S.C. § 3381 (Coordination of CI 
Activities) as legal authorities for conducting this type of collection. This is where I&A’s 
role becomes more prominent as the department’s lead for CI activities. 
The insider threat program is one leg of DHS’s overall insider threat mitigation 
effort. According to 2016 testimony from the DHS chief intelligence officer, DHS also 
considers the insider threat issue as a subset of I&A’s CI mission.106 The overall I&A CI 
mission is to “prevent adversaries from penetrating the department to exploit sensitive 
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information, operations, programs, personnel, and resources.”107 One key goal is to 
integrate CI activities across the DHS IE so as to “deepen our understanding of the 
threats posed by foreign intelligence entities and insider threats to DHS.”108 Furthermore, 
the DHS I&A CI Division embeds officers in each DHS IE component to assist with CI 
functions and insider threat programs.  
As part of this construct, DHS has created a CI and security board co-chaired by 
the DHS CI director (under I&A) and the DHS chief security officer to “integrate and 
align” CI and security programs across the various DHS agencies. The design of this 
board is meant to synchronize CI efforts with insider threat programs while combining 
the disciplines of CI and security to mitigate insider threats.109 With this framework, 
DHS is using both an offensive (CI) and defensive (security programs) approach to 
mitigate insider threats.  
2. Another Type of Insider Threat—Workplace Violence 
In June of 2016, a non-supervisory I&A employee, Jonathan Wienke, was arrested while 
carrying a prohibited and concealed firearm inside of DHS headquarters. He was able to 
enter the building and proceed past the security checkpoint by taking advantage of his 
employee facility access and less security scrutiny due to his status as a vetted employee. 
Public court documents indicate he may have intended “to commit an act of workplace 
violence.”110 According to the court filing, the investigating agent discovered Wienke 
had a firearm along with several radios, thermal imaging devices, and a knife.111 The 
agent also revealed there were reasons to believe Wienke intended to harm senior DHS 
officials meeting in the building that day.112  
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With Wienke, none of the DHS security programs involving background checks 
(vetting) identified him as an insider threat. The DHS insider threat program’s focus is on 
detecting nefarious intent through information technology systems monitoring. 
Suspicious data acquisition or theft was not Wienke’s intent, thus rendering this security 
program ineffective. In fact, Wienke was provided a Top Secret security clearance and 
was among one of the government’s most vetted classes of employees.113  
Herein lies one of the most critical challenges with the insider threat problem. In 
the case of I&A, using the department’s definition that an insider threat is someone who 
uses their employee access to harm the United States, there are simply too many insider 
threat scenarios for a single security program to identify them all. Identifying a known 
terrorist or known felon attempting to join I&A can be accomplished during the initial 
vetting of new employees. However, absent indicators from a law enforcement 
investigation or targeted intelligence collection, it is very difficult to predict the intent of 
a Jonathan Wienke (or other vetted employees).  
3. Final Thoughts on I&A’s Insider Threat Program 
The broader department (DHS) and I&A are newer government agencies lacking 
a lengthy historical record to analyze both previous insider threat cases and the success 
rate of its insider threat detection programs. At this point, it can be concluded that DHS’s 
insider threat programs started off as predominantly security focused with detection 
measures primarily centered on employee vetting and network information technology 
system monitoring. In recent years, I&A has taken on a more aggressive role to detect 
and mitigate insider threats through its CI program and the leveraging of common IC 
authorities such as U.S.C. Title 50 and E.O. 12333. The ultimate goal of I&A’s insider 
threat program is to integrate CI activities across the agencies comprising the DHS IE to 
better understand the threat from foreign intelligence entities and insider threats.114 There 
is not enough data at this time to fully evaluate the effectiveness of I&A’s CI program 
and insider threat mitigation. 
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The next section discusses the insider threat program of the FBI. The FBI has a 
defined track record and well established insider threat program along with some 
different authorities to investigate and collect domestic intelligence as both a law 
enforcement agency and an IC member.  
B. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
Since its establishment in 1908, the FBI’s mission and priorities have shifted over 
time to meet the most pressing law enforcement and domestic national security concerns 
of government.115 Today, the official FBI mission statement is “To protect the American 
people and uphold the Constitution of the United States.”116 It prioritizes its mission sets 
by focusing on counterterrorism, counterintelligence, counterespionage, cybercrimes, 
public corruption, major white collar crime, protection of civil rights, and combatting 
transnational criminal organizations.117 To accomplish this, it has over 56 field offices 
across the United States and an international presence at 60 U.S. embassies.118 The FBI is 
a key component of the insider threat deterrence and investigation functions across the 
federal government and private sector.119  
1. Scope and Current Policy 
The FBI’s insider threat concern is essentially twofold. First, it has over 35,000 
employees,120 illustrating the magnitude of the insider threat potential within its ranks. 
Second, per U.S.C. Title 50, it is the lead agency for domestic intelligence collection 
concerning foreign intelligence entities and CI, “including such information concerning 
corporations or other commercial organizations.”121 The FBI’s insider threat program is 
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primarily managed under the purview of its CI Division.122 However, security standards 
similar to those conducted by other U.S. government law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies are in place to vet employees prior to and during employment with the FBI. An 
FBI background investigation for Top Secret security clearance is required.123 This is 
then followed by “a polygraph examination; a test for illegal drug use; credit and records 
checks; and extensive interviews with former and current colleagues, neighbors, friends, 
professors, etc.”124 Today, the FBI performs a recurrent background investigation every 
five years and often along with another polygraph.125 
The FBI’s insider threat program also has a CI component and focus to it, and this 
relates directly to its traditional role mitigating national security threats from foreign 
intelligence entities. Thus, the FBI’s CI Division is “the lead agency for exposing, 
preventing, and investigation of intelligence activities on U.S. soil, and the 
Counterintelligence Division uses its full suite of investigative and intelligence 
capabilities to combat counterintelligence threats.”126 This traditional CI mission also 
applies directly to insider threat investigations. According to the FBI website, addressing 
insider threats relates to three of its four strategic goals: 
1. Protect the secrets of the U.S. Intelligence Community, using intelligence 
to focus investigative efforts, and collaborating with our government 
partners to reduce the risk of espionage and insider threats. 
2. Protect the nation’s critical assets, like our advanced technologies and 
sensitive information in the defense, intelligence, economic, financial, 
public health, and science and technology sectors. 
3. Counter the activities of foreign spies. Through proactive investigations, 
the Bureau identifies who they are and stops what they’re doing. 
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4. Keep weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands and 
use intelligence to drive the FBI’s investigative efforts to keep threats 
from becoming reality.127 
The first goal explicitly ties espionage with insider threats. Indeed, insiders are 
commonly used to conduct espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence entity or service. 
In Department of Defense circles, this is known as the “CI insider threat,” insiders who 
pose threats using their legitimate employee access to commit espionage on behalf of a 
foreign intelligence entity.128 This can be the case whether at a government agency or a 
private defense contractor. Goals two and three go hand in hand as they identify our 
nation’s critical assets and the need to protect these assets from the activities of foreign 
spies.  
The FBI CI Division utilizes a myriad of private sector and higher education 
engagement programs to help deter and investigate insider threats. Similar to the 
approach by CPNI (as discussed in the next subchapter), the FBI also conducts outreach 
to organizations in the private sector and academia to assist them with identifying 
personal factors, organizational factors, and behavioral indicators that could point toward 
a possible insider threat. The FBI has openly published less details on what its “profile” is 
for an insider threat, but it hints that lax security measures and enforcement along with a 
perfect storm of personal factors could make an employee more susceptible to 
recruitment by a foreign intelligence service or terrorist organization.129  
The FBI is particularly active in private sector outreach to help prevent economic 
espionage from insider threats. According to its website, “(f)oreign economic espionage 
against the U.S. is a significant and growing threat to our country’s economic health and 
security...and so is the threat from corporate insiders willing to carry it out.”130 The basic 
message is clear: American companies are choice targets for foreign intelligence entities, 
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criminals, and industry spies. A common method for stealing proprietary industry 
information is through insiders working at these companies. The FBI believes insiders 
often exhibit signs and indicators of their intent to act nefariously, but the signs are 
missed by co-workers.131 The FBI focuses its outreach efforts on educating private 
industry on what these indicators are and what types of economic information insider 
threats are most likely to target them.132 
The FBI runs a private sector outreach program called the FBI Business Alliance 
Initiative. The goal of this program is a “partnership effort between the FBI and private 
industry to protect research, products, and personnel from foreign intelligence threats.”133 
This program specifically identifies the insider threats as persons that have been recruited 
by foreign intelligence services or terrorist organizations.134 Thus, much of the program’s 
focus is on CI education in order to protect trade secrets and prevent economic espionage 
while encouraging suspicious incident reporting from the private industry stakeholder to 
the FBI.135 The FBI claims this initiative has assisted the private sector by increasing its 
knowledge and understanding of threats. The FBI also claims it has reciprocally received 
much broader awareness of private sector issues and concerns, as well as investigative 
leads.136 
Another key component of the FBI’s overall insider threat deterrence effort with 
the private sector is in the creation of multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams. These 
teams use behavioral indicators that the FBI identifies as possible signs of insider intent. 
Indicators could be personal workplace grievances, new interest in explosives or 
firearms, and fascination with other active shooter events in the media.137 Threat 
assessment teams  are recommended to contain members of management, security 
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personnel, counselors, mental health professionals, and other company employees. Threat 
assessment teams would then be ideally trained and ready to identify possible signs of 
insider threat intent and hopefully deter or interdict the threat before the insider can act. 
Threat assessment teams are also ready to interface with law enforcement and the FBI if 
needed for assistance.138 
The FBI also plays a key role in the overall organizational construct across the 
U.S. government to deter insider threats. Together with the National Counterintelligence 
Executive (from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), the FBI co-chairs the 
National Insider Threat Task Force which operates under the purview of the NCSC.139 
The NCSC works under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and 
provides expertise to executive department agencies and the private sector on insider 
threats, personnel security, and supply chain risk management.140 This organizational 
hierarchy reaffirms the connection between security and CI and the shared mission to 
combat insider threats.141 Unlike TSA, the FBI uses both the security and CI disciplines 
to counter insider threats.  
The FBI is actively engaged in insider threat investigation within the aviation 
system as well. In a 2015 statement to the House Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security, the deputy assistant director of the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division described the FBI’s efforts to work closely with all 
stakeholders in the aviation system (public and private).142 One of the major efforts he 
described is the FBI’s Civil Aviation Security Program. This program falls under the 
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authority of the FBI Counterterrorism Division and assigns airport liaison agents to each 
U.S. federalized airport. The liaison agents partners with TSA to perform vulnerability 
assessments and interact with private stakeholders in the aviation system.143 Finally, the 
program has produced intelligence products for the IC designed to mitigate the insider 
threat in the aviation system.144 
2. When All Fails: The Case of Robert Hanssen  
Despite the FBI’s aggressive efforts and domestic CI authorities, the agency has 
experienced its own insider threat problems. On July 6, 2001, Robert Hanssen pled guilty 
to 15 counts of espionage and conspiracy over a 20 year period.145 During this period, he 
sold secrets to the Soviet Union and Russia for $1.4 million in cash and diamonds.146 He 
is considered by many analysts to be the most damaging spy in U.S. history and the 
impact caused by his espionage has been described by the FBI as “exceptionally 
grave.”147 Hanssen’s case illustrates the concern of foreign intelligence entity insider 
threats. This threat stems from a foreign intelligence or government agency recruiting and 
handling an insider threat for the purpose of stealing information the insider has 
legitimate employee access to.148  
Hanssen began his espionage a few years into his career and continued off and on 
until February 2001 (when he was arrested). He was assigned to multiple assignments at 
FBI headquarters and even the State Department (as an FBI employee), and he was also 
granted access to highly sensitive CI and military information. Moreover, he 
compromised significant secrets, including the identities of human sources in the Soviet 
Union, which led to the execution of at least three of them. In addition, he provided the 
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KGB thousands of pages and dozens of computer disks “detailing U.S. strategies in the 
event of nuclear war, major developments in military weapons technologies, information 
on active espionage cases, and many other aspects of the U.S. IC’s Soviet CI 
program.”149 
Interestingly, Hanssen’s day-to-day behavior did not suggest he was involved in 
espionage, nor did it match many of the common signs of insider threat as exhibited by 
employees who pose an insider threat. His personal life did not fit a profile consistent 
with that of a spy. According to Fine, “He was married with six children, and appeared to 
be a devout Catholic…had no alcohol, drug, or gambling problems and did not engage in 
ostentatious spending.”150 However, he did display some financial habits that were 
possible indicators as well as a general inability and unwillingness to properly handle 
classified information. Nonetheless, these factors were largely ignored and 
undocumented, which allowed Hanssen to continue his espionage activities.151 Important 
to note is the FBI’s initial vetting (background investigation), pre-employment 
interviews, and periodic reviews of his suitability for continued access to sensitive 
information did not specify that Hanssen was expected to commit espionage.152 It only 
became apparent after he was caught that he suffered from “serious personal insecurities, 
low self-esteem, and a fascination with espionage.”153 His pattern of mishandling 
classified information began early in his career, but this was not solely pertaining to his 
espionage activities. For example, he became known for disclosing the existence of 
Soviet sources to people without a “need to know,” such as other FBI employees in other 
divisions. Additionally, there was an instance in which he committed a serious security 
violation when he disclosed sensitive information to a Soviet defector he was 
debriefing.154  
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While Hanssen was a liaison for the FBI at the State Department, he committed 
multiple security violations as well. He disclosed classified information to other agencies 
and employees (without a need to know), to close friends, and members of the press. At 
one point, he even attempted to install a password breaker program on his FBI computer. 
Although the last incident was detected and referred to the FBI’s security programs 
manager, Hanssen was able to adequately excuse his behavior and thus avoid any 
negative consequences for his actions.155 Systemic failures to document, report and take 
seriously so many security violations represent both a serious management failure and an 
organizational culture failure over two decades that repeatedly ignored concerning 
behaviors. 
3. Conclusion—A Shift toward “Trust, but Verify”  
The case of Robert Hanssen uncovered an overall lack of organizational controls 
and a workplace culture that enabled multiple instances of espionage and the 
inappropriate revelation of classified materials to be overlooked. Even worse, with 20/20 
hindsight, it is clear the FBI not only ignored Hanssen’s repeat security violations but 
also continued to promote him into positions with less supervisory oversight and access 
to more sensitive classified information. However, the Hanssen case did lead to a cultural 
shift and a “tightening down” of the security programs and on the workplace culture that 
had enabled his 20-plus years of espionage to occur. Instead of an insider threat program, 
which assumes a blanket level of trust in each employee, the FBI now requires 
verification via polygraphs, computer usage monitoring, financial disclosures, and 
periodic background reinvestigations, among other measures.156  
When compared to TSA, the FBI can leverage its additional law enforcement and 
CI authorities to further detect and investigate insider threats. Many of the security 
programs used by both agencies are similar, such as background checks (security 
clearances) and information technology systems monitoring. The FBI does appear to now 
require additional security precautions, such as financial disclosure forms and employee 
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polygraphs, which TSA does not generally require. Both agencies also work with external 
stakeholders and private sector companies to advise them on the seriousness of the 
insider threat. The key difference is that if TSA identifies suspicious behaviors indicative 
of a possible insider threat, it typically refers any follow up investigation to another 
agency, such as the FBI. The FBI is able to receive both internal and external referrals 
and proceed with either a CI collection operation or law enforcement investigation as 
needed. 
The following section takes us across the Atlantic Ocean to the United Kingdom 
to compare the insider threat policy from the English perspective. For the purpose of 
exploring a wide range of policy options, it is worthwhile to consider a foreign 
government agency with an established track record dealing with the insider threat 
problem. 
C. UNITED KINGDOM: CENTRE FOR PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
The United Kingdom United Kingdom executes insider threat mitigation policy 
though CPNI, which reports to the director general of MI5. CPNI takes on the role of 
expert advisor to both the government and private sector entities comprising the United 
Kingdom’s national critical infrastructure.157 This agency is an excellent example to 
examine because MI5 combines CI, counterterrorism, national security, and national 
level intelligence and investigation functions into a single agency. In comparison to the 
U.S. government, these functions are generally spread out across various agencies 
although the FBI’s mission and range of authorities shares some commonality with MI5. 
By “housing” all these functions at the national level within a single agency, we can 
establish a good comparison architecture for TSA and consider how an entity with broad 
investigation and intelligence collection authority counters insider threats. Like TSA, 
CPNI is also a relatively new organization, created on February 1, 2007 out of the merger 
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of the former National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre and the National 
Security Advice Centre.158  
CPNI’s primary function is to protect the United Kingdom’s national 
infrastructure. This lines up nicely with its parent organization’s (MI5) mission 
statement. Simply stated, “MI5’s mission is to keep the country safe.”159 In addition to 
insider threat prevention through the purview of CPNI, MI5 is responsible for  
the protection of national security and in particular its protection against 
threats such as terrorism, espionage and sabotage, the activities of agents 
of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine 
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.160  
These functions align with many aspects of the CI mission in the United States and the 
insider threat is a problem within each of these areas. This is important to point out 
because the policy development and outreach efforts of CPNI can result in direct internal 
referrals to the investigatory and intelligence collection branches of MI5. In this manner, 
TSA and CPNI are very similar. TSA lacks a true law enforcement investigation and 
intelligence collection capability and therefore generally refers insider threat issues to 
another federal agency, such as the FBI, with law enforcement authority. From a review 
of some of the more substantial insider threat cases discussed in Chapter II, it is 
reasonable to conclude the majority of TSA’s insider threat cases are referred to the FBI 
for investigation. 
1. Scope and Current Policy 
The United Kingdom government breaks its critical national infrastructure into 
nine different sections: communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, 
government, health, transport, and water.161 For the sake of comparison, these sectors 
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generally overlap with DHS’s critical infrastructure sectors in the United States.162 
Within these sectors lies a potential threat from terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and the 
activities of agents of foreign powers. CPNI “provides security guidance, training, and 
research from a physical, information and personnel security perspective. It aims 
specifically to reduce vulnerabilities within these sectors…”163 When it comes to insider 
threats, CPNI focuses on persons who exploit or have “the intention to exploit, their 
legitimate access to an organization’s assets for unauthorized purposes.”164 It is within 
this purview that CPNI oversees and advises the national infrastructure on insider threat 
issues and their mitigation. 
CPNI is a consumer of the United Kingdom’s national threat intelligence and uses 
this information to provide guidance to its national infrastructure operators to help them 
understand the threats it faces.165 Its focus is on prevention through awareness and it 
utilizes behavioral factors and models as information to help an organization create a 
culture of security.166 An area of primary emphasis is its focus on management’s role in 
creating an environment that minimizes insider threat vulnerabilities.167 However, 
perhaps most important is CPNI’s recognition of the need for private sector engagement 
within the United Kingdom’s critical infrastructure.168 According to the government of 
the United Kingdom , the vast majority of these services are owned by the private sector. 
Other estimates indicate as much as 85 percent of national critical infrastructure facilities 
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are privately owned.169 With such a large portion of the United Kingdom’s critical 
infrastructure owned by the private sector, it is crucial from a national security standpoint 
to engage and share information with these stakeholders. 
According to CPNI, there are five main types of insider activity: “unauthorized 
disclosure of sensitive information; process corruption; facilitation of third party access 
to an organization’s assets, physical sabotage; and electronic or IT sabotage.”170 CPNI 
strictly maintains an advisory and assessment role, and it does not directly collect 
intelligence or investigate suspicious activity. CPNI recommends organizations contact 
law enforcement to address illegal activity. However, if an employer believes an 
employee has a tie to terrorism or extremism, CPNI prefers to initially handle the 
investigation and refer it internally within MI5 as needed. When called upon, CPNI 
examines the information and may pass the information on to relevant investigatory 
bodies for follow up.171  
CPNI favors using insider threat risk assessment models to help an organization 
realize the security vulnerabilities an insider posing a threat might try to compromise. Its 
models focus on the following elements: 
1. Identify the critical assets 
2. Identify the threat based on intent and capability of the insider 
3. Assess the likelihood of the threat occurring 
4. Assess the business impact if the threat occurred 
5. Review and evaluate effectiveness of existing countermeasures 
6. Propose new appropriate measures to reduce security risks.172 
Once CPNI identifies risks, these are then used to create implementable security 
procedures designed to mitigate insider threats. CPNI provides an extensive risk 
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assessment model focusing on the job roles of employees, their access within the 
organization’s critical assets, and the risk their positions pose to the organization if an 
insider threat is present.173 The CPNI risk assessment models focus on the organizational 
structures, policies, and vulnerabilities to an insider threat. By completing the 
assessments, an organization will have more clarity regarding the likelihood an insider 
threat is present, the areas targeted by the insider, and the most appropriate mitigation 
measures to reduce vulnerabilities. 
CPNI also conducts detailed studies of the profile and behavioral indicators of a 
possible insider threat by a perpetrator based on data from previous insider threat cases. 
Although they are still applicable, CPNI’s data indicates the effectiveness of pre-
employment checks as a preventative measure is perhaps overstated. From its research 
into insider threat cases in the United Kingdom, CPNI has identified that 76 percent of 
perpetrators did not join their organization intending to commit an insider act.174 It is 
sometime after their initial employment when they decide to leverage their position and 
employee access to carry out an insider threat.175 In fact, CPNI found that only six 
percent of insider threat cases in its study involved a perpetrator who sought employment 
specifically to further an insider plot.176 This is particularly concerning given the focus 
TSA places on pre-employment background checks and vetting to prevent insider threats, 
which this data would indicate is not effective on its own. In comparison, TSA continues 
to emphasize aviation worker vetting (initial and recurrent) as a primary tactic for 
preventing insider threats from being employed in the aviation system. 
Another facet of CPNI’s outreach efforts is designed to highlight organizational 
deficiencies with the potential of leading to more exploitable weaknesses within an 
organization’s security and management practices. CPNI identifies several organizational 
traits it believes are key enablers for insider acts. They are 
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1. Poor management practices 
2. Poor usage of auditing functions  
3. Lack of protective security controls  
4. Poor security culture  
5. Lack of adequate role-based personnel security risk assessment prior to 
employment 
6. Poor pre-employment screening 
7. Poor communication between business areas 
8. Lack of awareness of people risk at a senior level and inadequate 
governance.177 
This list of exploitable organizational weaknesses identifies many factors that TSA does 
not appear to consider. TSA’s focus is on pre-employment screening (vetting), suspicious 
indicators (once employed), and physical access control. In contrast, CPNI places a lot of 
effort on identifying management’s role in establishing a workplace environment and 
culture to decrease insider threat vulnerabilities. Most failures in organizational practice 
are management failures to establish proper policies and a proper security culture for 
mitigating insider threats. 
One of the main initiatives created and executed by CPNI is known as the 
Motivation Project. This is an interactive survey designed to achieve a highly inspired 
security workforce within the United Kingdom’s critical infrastructure facilities. It seeks 
to create the conditions in which “a highly motivated workforce can have a beneficial 
impact on performance, attitudes and behaviours, and support … business efficiency and 
effectiveness.”178 The practical guidance suggests that high workforce drive leads to 
more efficient security. CPNI’s approach is to encompass all the factors identified above 
regarding insider threat indicators and to create a high performing security culture 
limiting insider threat vulnerabilities through awareness and proactive reporting. The 
Motivation Project is representative of a holistic approach to organizational culture and 
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management to naturally deter insider threats due in large part to high levels of workforce 
drive to create a high performing security organization.179  
The critical factor measured by the Motivation Project is not just the level of 
motivation within the security workforce, but the type of motivation as well. A staff that 
is highly driven but misdirects its enthusiasm can be problematic. For example, 
employees might be highly ambitious and capable but management’s expectations of 
them are too low, which creates a culture of low performance. On the other hand, the 
company’s culture can be so poor it actually creates high levels of incentive for 
employees to behave in counterproductive ways. CPNI believes insider threats are the 
direct byproduct of a negative management security culture that opens itself up to the 
eight organizational practices identified above that are considered to be key enablers.180 
TSA does not appear to consider these points, and its focus on vetting and access control 
suggests TSA believes insider threat perpetrators are uniquely susceptible (or even pre-
determined) to becoming insider threats from day one.  
2. Organizational Culture as Insider Threat Mitigation 
In a 2011 case study involving the Motivation Project, CPNI worked with 
Birmingham Airport in the United Kingdom to introduce positive efficiency changes by 
improving workplace motivation. Birmingham Airport is an interesting example because 
it represents one of the United Kingdom’s busiest airports while simultaneously 
experiencing rapid growth and changes to its infrastructure. Birmingham Airport employs 
over 200 security staff for security screening checkpoint operations. In recent years, it has 
seen substantial operating changes through a redesign of the checkpoint environment and 
the introduction of new technologies and systems.181 
The CPNI motivation survey identified four key areas for improving staff 
motivation: performance feedback, team building, job fundamentals (breaks and 
rotations), and management fairness and consistency. CPNI’s survey results helped 
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Birmingham Airport to come up with a set of short-, mid-, and long-term initiatives for 
its employees. The first step was to pull the top layer of management from the frontline 
operations. In turn, this enabled greater flexibility and operational control for the frontline 
managers, and they became the only management level in direct contact with frontline 
employees.  
Step two changed the job title of the rank and file from “guard” to “security duty 
officer.”182 This step was designed to change the culture from one guarding a specific 
area to that of an “officer” who “delivers a great security service coupled with great 
customer service.”183 The change in job title also served to further professionalize the 
position and duties.  
The third step was to adapt a different approach to customer service to train all 
officers to better communicate with the differing personalities of the public they serve. 
Step four was to improve supervisor performance by measuring employees in new areas 
such as customer service, cost efficiency and compliance. The fifth step similarly 
improved supervisor performance by requiring a monthly one-on-one sit down with each 
employee to increase trust and confidence within this relationship. Finally, came the 
establishment of several workplace improvements and mentorship/employee growth 
opportunities to improve communication and staff development.184  
The initial product of these changes was a significant improvement and greater 
unity as a team. Leaders developed a keener sense of purpose and trust with their 
subordinates improved substantially.185 The Birmingham Airport example is a good case 
study of a successful implementation of CPNI’s private sector insider threat mitigation 
engagement strategy because it directly addresses the eight organizational practices 
identified in the previous section that are key enablers for insider threats. The motivation 
survey and outreach are enviable as is its understanding of the enterprise perspective of 
cultural factors that “create” insider threats due to employee job dissatisfaction. The 
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Birmingham Airport example shows that perhaps the best byproduct of increasing 
security force motivation is the creation of a proactive security culture to minimize the 
organization’s vulnerable points to an insider threat.  
3. Conclusion—Proactive Prevention through Organizational Culture 
CPNI places a heavy emphasis on identifying and detecting the root causes of an 
insider threat from the perspective of the perpetrator, management culture, and the 
victimized organization. With this mindset, CPNI preaches a message of proactive 
prevention through organizational culture as the best policy for mitigating insider threats. 
This starkly contrasts with the U.S. government’s approach, which focuses on the 
integration of security, CI, user audits/monitoring, and “other safeguarding 
capabilities.”186 CPNI considers such practices as part of an overall insider threat policy, 
but it attempts to do more on the front end with its management culture and workplace 
environment to minimize enablers and vulnerabilities. TSA’s emphasis is on identifying 
known risks during the vetting process and physical access control procedures. Like 
CPNI, TSA has an outreach responsibility to external stakeholders in the aviation domain 
such as airport operators and airlines and is ideally positioned to receive suspicious 
activity reports pointing to possible insider threat activity. 
TSA can also provide referrals to other investigating organizations when external 
stakeholders report suspicious activity to TSA. So there are some similarities in insider 
threat mitigation efforts between CPNI and TSA. However, there are two major 
differences to consider. First, TSA does not have an investigation or a CI mission and 
must reach out to external agencies to further develop an insider threat investigation. As 
part of MI5, CPNI can refer suspicious indicators reported by the private sector to its 
internal investigations and domestic intelligence collection teams. Second, TSA does not 
consider organizational culture and management policies and practices as key enablers to 
insider threat vulnerabilities as CPNI does.  
The last section of this chapter introduces the insider threat program operated by a 
private company and major defense contractor, Lockheed Martin. This company has a 
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history of addressing insider threats (mainly from the foreign espionage angle) and a very 
mature program worth evaluating. 
D. LOCKHEED MARTIN 
Lockheed Martin is a “global security and aerospace company that employs 
approximately 97,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, 
design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology 
systems, products and services.”187 Its overall mission is to “solve complex challenges, 
advance scientific discovery and deliver innovative solutions to help our customers keep 
people safe.”188 Its business is divided into four separate operating units: aeronautics, 
missiles and fire control, rotary systems, and space systems.189 In plain language, 
Lockheed Martin builds high tech aircraft, missiles, missile defense systems, helicopters, 
and satellites (including delivery vehicles) along with all of the research, logistics, and 
operations required to create and produce these systems. 
Lockheed Martin’s primary customer base is the U.S. Department of Defense and 
other federal government agencies. It also has a large international presence in at least 70 
countries and over 7,000 international employees.190 Its future investments are primarily 
in the development of advanced weapon and protection systems involving robotics, direct 
energy weapons, electronic warfare, and cyber security.191 Additionally, Lockheed 
Martin develops and produces cutting edge, sensitive technologies primarily for 
battlefield usage. As a result, the company must consider the consequences of having its 
technology and research compromised by an insider working, whether intentionally or 
unwittingly, for a foreign intelligence entity and posing a threat to the company. In fact, 
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Lockheed Martin directly correlates its international presence with increased exposure to 
foreign intelligence entities, in turn leading to an increase in insider threats.192 
1. Scope and Current Policy 
Lockheed Martin’s immediate insider threat concern starts from within the 
company’s 97,000 employees. However, the company recognizes that it must consider its 
contractors, suppliers, and other business partners that have authorized access to the 
company’s systems and information as possible sources of insider threats as well.193 The 
company’s large international presence offers additional exposure opportunities to 
foreign intelligence entities that TSA generally does not experience, certainly not to the 
same scale. The company’s Director of Counterintelligence Operations and Corporate 
Investigations, Douglas Thomas, is also concerned that periods of global economic 
downturn could lead to increased foreign intelligence entity attempts to acquire new 
technologies and research, resulting in increased attempts to steal industry information 
from American firms overseas.194 According to Robert Trono, Vice President and Chief 
Security Officer at Lockheed Martin, “U.S. corporations have seen a dramatic increase in 
economic and industrial espionage threats over the past five years, and we do not see this 
trending data decreasing for the foreseeable future.”195 It is thus reasonable to conclude 
that Lockheed Martin is very aware of the threat posed by a foreign intelligence entity 
using a company insider to steal proprietary technology for both economic and military 
benefits. 
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Lockheed Martin has a well-established and proactive insider threat program. The 
company is generally recognized as an industry leader in insider threat mitigation and 
was selected in 2014 by Chief Security Officer (CSO) Magazine as one of the top 40 
companies that demonstrate outstanding business value and thought leadership for 
security project initiatives.196 In particular, the company was lauded for its Insider Threat 
Detection Program (ITDP) as it  
proactively identifies and mitigates internal risks associated with the theft 
or misuse of intellectual property and trade secrets. It can identify 
employees who are at higher risk for being targeted by foreign intelligence 
or those who are more likely to misuse access privileges to protected 
information.197  
The ITDP has also been praised within the U.S. government and among companies in the 
private sector as the “model” program, according to Robert Trono.198 Based on its 
requirements as a defense contractor working on classified technology, many employees 
must undergo security clearance (background) investigations and must revalidate their 
security clearances annually.199 
The Lockheed Martin ITDP defines the following five steps as the vital 
components of its ITDP: 
1. Gain leadership support 
2. Leverage the latest technology 
3. Develop a communications plan 
4. Execute a training and awareness campaign 
5. Establish a governance structure200 
The first step requires attaining support across the executive leadership team not 
just in principle, but to the point at which leaders fully understand the types of threats 
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facing the company and the consequences if the company falls victim to those threats. 
Within this step is demonstration to employees that the ITDP is aligned with the 
company’s culture, and it addresses both privacy and legal concerns.201 This is a point 
worth expanding upon from a comparison standpoint with TSA. Although it is reasonably 
implied that TSA’s insider threat programs have leadership support (or the programs 
likely would not exist), a big difference in Lockheed Martin’s approach is that it 
formalizes this step and takes additional steps to ensure leadership buy in across the 
company’s various organizational layers. Another side effect of leadership buy in is 
assistance in gathering financial support for insider threat initiatives. This is a critical 
component given the need for more and more advanced information technology and 
digital monitoring systems to detect insiders attempting to steal data from the company’s 
information technology systems.202 
Second, the ITDP leverages technology as a key component. This goes beyond 
just cyber, data loss, and information technology monitoring capabilities and also feeds 
into an analytical tool to make the data useable to a CI investigator. In essence, this 
enables identifying what the company refers to as “anomalous behavior” on its networks 
that cues an internal CI inquiry.203 These analytical tools are designed to integrate with 
“network and behavioral risk indicators from other business functions such as HR and 
corporate security.”204 The purpose is to provide proactive prioritization for follow up 
investigations on those portraying behavioral risk indicators both in their daily 
interactions with other employees and their information technology system usage. Thus, 
the latest technology solution can utilize big data to provide the most accurate 
investigatory leads and better analysis of behavior on company systems of an insider who 
poses a threat.205  
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Step three of the ITDP is establishing a companywide communications plan and 
strategy before new insider threat policies and protocols are initiated. Lockheed Martin 
regards this step as “opaque transparency,” and it is designed to gain support and close 
coordination with multiple departments while not giving away the critical components of 
the program.206 One of the interesting things Lockheed Martin discovered in this stage is 
the benefit of receiving feedback from the company rank and file on the message before 
it is pushed out to all employees. For example, inflammatory or counterproductive 
language interpreted as fostering a “big brother” or “snitch” mentality can be eliminated 
to help garner employee and management support.207  
Next, Lockheed Martin established a training and awareness campaign (step four) 
to not just educate it employees on the insider threat issue but also to alleviate employee 
concerns. It trains on internal and external threats and tactics used by foreign intelligence 
entities and industry competitors, and it provides guidance on how employees can protect 
themselves and the company.208 As an industry leader in insider threat mitigation, 
Lockheed Martin recognizes the need to not only teach employees which behavioral 
indicators to look for but also to administer knowledge surveys to gauge changes in 
employee perceptions and overall program effectiveness.209  
The final step (five) in its ITDP is to establish a governance structure. The 
purpose is to ensure the ITDP operates legally and compliant with company regulations. 
A crucial aspect is also to setup an oversight process and procedures for internal 
investigations.210 Privacy considerations are important throughout the steps of the ITDP, 
especially in the last step. For example, how is the data collected from step two 
(leveraging technology) viewed and shared? Another potential issue involves privacy if 
employees are believed to pose an insider threat or demonstrates indicators of an insider 
threat on the company’s network, yet further investigation into their actions reveals the 
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employee is not an insider threat concern. These are all issues the company works out in 
advance across its various departments to ensure proper handling of employees’ privacy. 
Lockheed Martin does not openly publish its privacy policies, but it clearly engages its 
legal team as a partner in the ITDP continually. 
Another point of interest is the company’s integration of CI and insider threat 
detection. First, the company performs internal investigations by utilizing a cadre of 
experienced CI professionals.211 This same CI cadre takes the lead on insider threat 
education, mitigation, detection, and investigations. Based on the publicly available 
literature, it appears that Lockheed Martin obliterates the line between security and CI 
and integrates the two concepts. For the most part, at least organizationally speaking, the 
company seems to house these functions under its overall CI program.212  
Without access to company resources, it is difficult to ascertain for certain how 
Lockheed Martin divides security functions between other departments and its CI staff, 
but we can derive reasonable conclusions based on the information on its public 
webpage. First, as discussed earlier in this section, Lockheed Martin’s human resource 
department represents the first security measure for new employees since it processes 
each employee’s government security clearance and requires an annual security clearance 
revalidation.213 These types of government security clearance investigations can be 
considered a form of employee vetting and re-vetting. Second, the company employs 
information technology system monitoring. Its internal (intranet) login page can be 
accessed on the World Wide Web through a simple search. Upon opening the page, there 
is a disclaimer that employees should have no expectation of privacy on the company 
network and their usage “may be monitored and recorded by system personnel or by third 
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parties.”214 From this information, it appears Lockheed Martin spreads out security 
functions across different company departments and that a cadre of CI professionals 
design policy, educate the workforce, and perform follow up investigations when 
suspicious activity is detected.  
2. Targeting the Unwitting Insider Threat 
This thesis has discussed examples of insiders whose actions were specifically 
driven to further their own end goals whether they were working for a foreign 
intelligence entity, terrorist organization (or ideology), or were criminally motivated. 
However, an insider threat can also involve an unwitting insider. This occurs when an 
individual is “deceived into advancing our adversaries’ objectives without knowingly 
doing so.”215 In today’s digital world, unwitting insiders are often targeted through cyber 
social engineering schemes designed to get their login credentials to a company or 
agency’s intranet and access to the sensitive data that resides on internal networks. 
In 2016, a Chinese citizen with permanent residency in Canada pled guilty to 
charges surrounding a cyber-hacking scheme that resulted in the theft of trade secrets 
from American defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin.216 Su Bin utilized at 
least one unwitting insider at Lockheed Martin to gain access to the company’s digital 
files. According to a U.S. Attorney’s Office press release from the Central District of 
California, Su Bin “worked with two unindicted co-conspirators based in China to 
infiltrate computer systems and obtain confidential information about military programs, 
including the C-17 transport aircraft, the F-22 fighter jet, and the F-35 fighter jet.”217 The 
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F-22 and F-35 are both designed and manufactured by Lockheed Martin.218 The charges 
against him relate to “unauthorized computer access, a conspiracy to illegally export 
defense articles and a conspiracy to steal trade secrets.”219 
Su Bin was the owner of a Chinese aviation company with offices located in 
Canada. He was also the central figure in an international hacking organization that stole 
sensitive digital data from American defense contractors. Su Bin worked with two 
officers from the Chinese military who facilitated the technical aspects of the 
operation.220 Their strategy was remarkably simple and effective. Specific procedures 
and tactics have not been revealed by investigators to the public, but there is enough 
detail to ascertain the basics of the operation. First, the unwitting insider was specifically 
(by name) targeted by the perpetrators as someone reasonably believed to have access to 
sensitive data of value. Next, one of the military officers involved sent phishing emails to 
the targeted employee. The senders socially engineered the emails to have the appearance 
of a legitimate email from a colleague.221 The email directed the employees to a website 
under the hackers’ control, and this enabled them to gain access to Lockheed Martin’s 
systems to start installing malware. Once in the system, the military officers copied files 
to send to Su Bin, who translated the files and helped direct further theft efforts.222  
The effectiveness of this operation (before it was uncovered) is only eclipsed by 
its own brilliance and simplicity. Instead of exposing an intelligence agent to recruit an 
insider at Lockheed Martin, those involved instead duped a company employee into 
granting them digital access to the information they sought. This operation reflects the 
reality of today’s digital world and the serious impact of an unwitting insider threat. In 
the Su Bin hacking scenario, there were no behavioral indicators to predict which 
employee had become the unwitting insider threat. Education, awareness, and a proactive 
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culture of threat recognition are perhaps the only way to prevent an employee from being 
coopted into an insider threat.  
3. Conclusion—Organizational Culture and CI Are Key 
Lockheed Martin’s insider threat detection program is an interesting example to 
study because it combines its security programs with a robust CI program. This is 
noteworthy because Lockheed Martin is a private company and not a member of the IC, 
yet it operates a very CI-focused insider threat program. It has an excellent organizational 
structure and response policy that seems keenly aware of what can be handled “in house,” 
and when the CI investigation meets the threshold for FBI involvement. However, the 
key component is the establishment of a security and insider threat awareness culture 
considered by many to be a model program for both industry and government. 
The following chapter offers analysis of the different policies identified within 
each of the reviewed organizations. There are strengths, weaknesses, and limitations 
inherent in any approach to the insider threat problem. Are there additional options for 
TSA to consider to strengthen its programs, and even more importantly, is TSA even 
allowed to perform certain countermeasures? These issues are explored next. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: WHAT DOES THE IDEAL 
INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM LOOK LIKE? 
The policies and practices of the organizations identified in the previous chapter 
suggest there are three primary areas of focus for preventing, detecting, mitigating, and 
investigating insider threats. These can be broken out into the following:  
1. Security programs 
2. Counterintelligence 
3. Organizational culture 
A reciprocally supportive construct across these three areas is key for a balanced 
approach to the insider threat problem. 
A. SECURITY PROGRAMS 
All the organizations reviewed in the previous chapter view security programs as 
a critical cornerstone to deterring and detecting insider threats. Security programs are 
defensive and akin to a goalie patrolling the net. They know what they are defending 
against and the area (goal) they are protecting. Unfortunately, even the best goalies from 
time to time have the ball kicked past them.  
At their core, security programs can be split into two main categories: personnel 
vetting and access control. Personnel vetting ensures there is a review of an employee’s 
suitability and trustworthiness for employment. When it comes to insider threat 
prevention, this is often the first step. Before an employees receive access to sensitive 
areas or systems, they must first pass a background check. For all the organizations 
reviewed in this thesis, the background check is designed to ensure trustworthiness and 
the absence of any concerning criminal or terrorism records relevant to the applicant. For 
the U.S. based organizations, the background check is often in the form of a government 
security clearance designed to ensure each employee “shall be reliable, trustworthy, of 
good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United 
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States.”223 According to a 2015 DHS OIG report entitled TSA Can Improve Aviation 
Worker Vetting, the inspector general determined TSA does an effective job of aviation 
worker vetting against terrorism watchlists on an initial and recurring basis.224 This is 
especially impressive given the sheer number of employees and aviation workers they 
have to vet.  
As a function of most U.S. government security clearances, a periodic 
reinvestigation usually occurs at an interval of every five to 10 years.225 From the insider 
threat prevention standpoint, this period of re-vetting is designed to detect and deter an 
insider who may pose a threat and who already has been employed for several years. On 
the surface, this measure makes sense since the research demonstrates that 76 percent of 
insider who became threats decided to act after their they had already been employed.226 
In other words, their employment was not a purposeful penetration of the organization 
designed to gain access in accordance with a preexisting plot. It is at some point during 
their employment that three out of four insiders who become threats decide to carry out 
an illegal plot. One can conclude that a pending reinvestigation has a deterrent influence 
on some potential insider threats. TSA’s re-vetting programs, whether for aviation 
workers or their own employees, are continuously improving, such as the increasing 
adapting of the FBI Rapback program.227  
The standard for most IC agencies (including the FBI) is regular and recurring 
employee polygraph examinations. There is some debate, however, as to whether a 
polygraph has a CI function or security function. This section includes discussion on 
polygraph program here in the context of it being a security program since the FBI 
houses it polygraph program in its security division. Due to fallout from the Hanssen 
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case, the FBI now requires a polygraph as part of the standard five-year background 
reinvestigation for employees.228 The implied assumption is that a regular polygraph has 
the capability to detect an insider threat, although there is little data available to 
substantiate this. Still, employee polygraphs can be considered a common practice to 
detect insider threats. TSA does not appear to conduct employee polygraphs, nor is there 
a strong argument for doing so now as TSA does not face the same foreign intelligence 
entity threat as the FBI and it already performs in-depth criminal records checks. 
Access control, both physical and virtual on information technology systems, is 
the second critical component of insider threat security programs. All the organizations 
reviewed in Chapter III either have or encourage a form of information technology 
system monitoring as one of the backbone security programs in the twenty-first century. 
E.O. 13587 is very explicit about this and mandates all U.S. executive branch agencies 
apply such protections to prevent the inappropriate disclosure of classified and sensitive 
data taken from information technology systems.229 TSA appears to comply with this 
section of E.O. 13587. 
Physical access control is another critical component of an insider threat program. 
Physical access control ensures only adequately vetted personnel can physically enter 
(access) areas that correspond with their duties and job requirements. These controls add 
a layer of security and an opportunity to discover insiders posing threats attempting to get 
into places for which they have no workplace requirement. However, the very definition 
of an insider threat implies an ability to work around physical access controls because the 
insider has been granted legitimate, employee access to controlled areas.230 It is difficult 
to evaluate TSA’s performance in this area because it mostly regulates physical access 
controls only, and airport industry officials agree that there are no best practices to apply 
nationwide due to differences in layout, operation tempo, and feasible security 
measures.231  
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Overall, good security programs are essential to detecting and deterring an insider 
threat. These programs serve as a baseline for doing as much due diligence as possible so 
that employees gaining physical or virtual access to sensitive areas or systems are loyal 
and do not intend to become an insider threat. As discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter, security programs are a protective measure, a defensive tactic. Security programs 
beg the follow-up question: what are the next steps if a security program detects activity 
indicative of an insider threat? 
B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
If security programs are the shield, then CI programs are the sword. These 
operations are most efficient once an employee exhibits insider threat indicators. 
Lockheed Martin considers this step a “soft inquiry” designed to peel back the anomalous 
behavior to see if there is a nefarious intent.232 CI operations are used by I&A, the FBI, 
and Lockheed Martin to address the insider threat problem once a security program 
develops a lead. This is also the perspective of the ODNI. Published by ODNI, the 2016 
National CI Strategy discusses the natural partnership and handoff between security and 
CI programs. It states, the “U.S. government must strengthen its CI programs and 
processes to adapt to the complexity of foreign intelligence entity and insider threats.”233 
The CI strategy document also acknowledges the essential role of integrating security 
programs and CI as a force multiplier, stating, “This strategy acknowledges the critical 
role of security programs in contributing to the integrity of our CI efforts.”234     
CI is inherently going to involve a level of invasive intelligence collection. U.S.C. 
Title 50, § 3001 defines it as: 
…information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, 
exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, 
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, 
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organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist groups 
or activities.235  
Insiders associated with criminal organizations do not fit neatly into this definition of CI, 
but the CI tactics are the same regardless of whether the insider is a terrorist or a criminal.  
U.S.C Title 50 authorizes a CI function for IC members only. For example, 
performing an intelligence mission, FBI units are explicitly given authorization to 
“(c)ollect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate 
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to support national and departmental 
missions.”236 According to the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, “The United States Code is a consolidation and codification by subject 
matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States.”237 Therefore, Title 50 
contains at least some of the legal authority for IC agencies to conduct CI activities 
directed at mitigating insider threats. Determining exactly how much authority Title 50 
provides for CI exceeds the scope of this thesis, but it does appear that Title 50 grants 
specific authorization for CI activities to certain federal agencies. 
This delineation is necessary to point out because TSA is not included as a 
member of the IC and therefore does not have Title 50 authority to conduct CI activities. 
Further analysis of whether other legal authorities exist that could grant CI power to TSA 
is a research gap that could be the subject of future research. For now, given TSA does 
not have specific statutory authorization to conduct a CI program and is not designated as 
an IC member, it is safe to assume TSA is not able to use CI investigations or a CI 
collection program to investigate and develop intelligence collection operations against 
insider threats.  
As a counterpoint, Lockheed Martin relies very heavily on its internal CI program 
for insider threat investigation even though it is not a member of the IC. It is difficult to 
make an apple-to-apple comparison between TSA, a government agency, and Lockheed 
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Martin, a private company; however, Lockheed Martin’s utilization of CI as an internal 
tactic without conducting intelligence collection operations is worthy of emulation in 
TSA since it would serve as a method for TSA to incorporate CI principles and “soft 
inquiries,” without overstepping its authority by performing a domestic intelligence (CI) 
collection operation. As a key privacy consideration, Lockheed Martin’s CI program does 
not collect any information not already gathered through other corporate initiatives.238 In 
contrast, TSA would need to refer a more complicated CI operation involving domestic 
intelligence collection against foreign intelligence entities  to the FBI.239 This appears 
consistent with TSA’s policy of referrals of insider threat cases (such as the Terry Lee 
Loewen case discussed earlier) to the FBI for further investigation.  
Historically, the FBI has addressed insider threats as a CI issue. Since it is a law 
enforcement agency and a member of the IC, it has more options for pursuing insider 
threat investigations than TSA does. One of these options is the use of intrusive CI 
collection methods, such as the previously discussed controlled source and double agent 
operations.240 CI methods are one tactic that could conceivably assist TSA with workers 
in the aviation environment. The ability to run a controlled source operation in the 
aviation domain could lead to developing more leads and cases to uncover possible 
insider threats. This method could have been of use at Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
Airport a few years ago, for example, and it may have helped to identify radicalized 
individuals before they were ready to fight with terrorist organizations overseas.  
As an IC member, I&A also appears to be developing a CI capability for the 
entire DHS apparatus. It is not yet clear how aggressive I&A will be in using its CI staff 
for insider threat intelligence collection and investigations, but it is worthwhile to 
consider if TSA can tap into I&A CI resources to conduct CI operations when a TSA 
security program or lead hints at an insider threat within the aviation system. According 
to 2016 testimony to the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 
testimony, then Chief Intelligence Officer for DHS Francis Taylor stated that one of the 
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goals of the I&A CI program is to “deepen our understanding of threats posed by foreign 
intelligence entities and insider threats to DHS.”241 An additional goal is proactive 
training development and “effective investigative efforts.”242 It is reasonable to conclude 
the I&A CI program would allow for CI investigations across the different DHS 
components shortly. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Both CPNI and Lockheed Martin champion the principle of insider threat 
detection and mitigation through corporate culture. This concept is surprisingly easy to 
quantify. Only six percent of insider threat cases from a CPNI study indicate the insider 
joined its organizations with the intent to become an insider to pose a threat, meaning 
deliberate infiltration.243In contrast, three out of four insiders who posed threats gained 
employment with CPNI first and then noticed opportunities to exploit their employee 
access to sensitive areas and systems.244 This statistic speaks for itself as to the 
importance of establishing an organizational culture that not only “hardens the target” as 
deterrence, but one that also minimizes the motivations of employees as insiders to 
become threats during employment. The same CPNI study found the primary reason for 
becoming an insider posing a threat is financial gain; 47 percent of insiders cited this as 
their primary incentive. Ideology came in second at 20 percent,245 which is more difficult 
to counter through cultural change since we can assume their ideology clashed with the 
organization’s values or they would not have chosen to become an insider posing a threat. 
The final leading factor is a “desire for recognition” at 14 percent,246 and this can be 
addressed through management practices. 
These statistics help drive home the importance of increasing workplace 
satisfaction and morale as insider threat prevention measures. Often, these are human 
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resources and management issues, not security or CI related problems. When the 
organizational culture fails the employees in these areas, the result can be an employee 
actively wishing to harm the organization. More study is required to understand the 
financial motive of the 47 percent that cited an economic driver as their goal for 
becoming an insider threat.247 It is not clear if a slightly higher salary or better workplace 
morale could have dissuaded these from their threatening activities.  
Regardless, establishing a workplace culture of insider threat awareness 
represents a best practice because it helps make the organization a “hardened target.” In 
particular, Lockheed Martin has done an excellent job of marrying a threat awareness 
culture with CI investigations. The company’s security programs encourage “engaged 
employees” to report on suspicious indicators and develop potential leads. These cultural 
changes took about two years to accomplish and resulted in the termination of 13 
employees who had been displaying insider threat indicators and appeared ready to 
commit nefarious acts.248 Lockheed Martin changed its threat awareness culture by 
educating employees on insider threat signs while tying the threat to national security, 
revenue, and job implications for its employees.249  
None of the literature on TSA’s programs mention organizational culture as an 
insider threat deterrent. This gap is one area where TSA can further enhance its strategy 
to counter insider threats within its agency. 
D. CONCLUSION—FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
The insider threat mitigation measures analyzed in this chapter represent the three 
primary schools of thought on how to counter insider threats. One of the weaknesses of 
the TSA, I&A, and even the FBI insider threat program is the focus on detection and 
response. This focus assumes there will be an ideologically or criminally driven 
individual lurking in the shadows and waiting for an opportunity to leverage legitimate 
employee access to further a plot. While this may be true to an extent, it tends to ignore 
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the effect of an organization’s cultural factors in preventing insiders posing threats from 
acting because they have a security awareness ethos with full support across the entire 
leadership apparatus. Thorough cultural engagement is where it becomes clear that 
Lockheed Martin’s ITDP represents the most comprehensive insider threat program 
among the organizations this thesis reviews. Finding the right balance between deterrence 
and response is good policy for the insider threat problem. 
The next chapter discusses some specific recommendations for TSA to enact to 
improve upon its insider threat program while also identifying areas for further research 
that could identify more measures for TSA to adopt. The research does not reveal a 
perfect formula for mitigating insider threats within an organization. However, it is 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
There is no “one size fits all” approach to creating an insider threat program. 
Insider threat is ultimately a “people” problem and not a distinct information technology 
problem, access problem, or CI problem. The vulnerabilities that an insider threat 
program attempts to reveal are the same vulnerabilities that an insider posing a threat is 
ideally positioned to exploit. This ultimately becomes an issue of identifying employee 
intent and attempting to peek into the future. Still, there are a variety of measures that can 
be taken to improve TSA’s insider threat program.  
Stated simply, the first goal of an insider threat program should be prevention by 
not employing an insider threat in the first place. The next goal is to deter the insider 
threat from acting owed to a perceived likelihood of discovery. Finally, if an insider 
cannot be deterred, then they need to be detected and investigated. A comprehensive 
insider threat program must incorporate all three of these goals. 
TSA is inherently limited in its ability to perform offensive measures due to its 
lack of law enforcement and intelligence collection authorities. With a little creativity, 
however, there are still many measures TSA can enact to remain proactive in addressing 
the insider threat.  
1. Recommendation 1: Increase the Use of the TSA VIPR Program in 
the Airport Environment 
There was a broad consensus from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee in 
2015 that the expectation for physical screening of aviation workers on any given 
workday is an excellent insider threat prevention tool.250 Although more study regarding 
the expectation of possible screening vice the certainty of physical screening each day 
needs to be conducted in order to determine if this assumption is correct, it is within the 
realm of good sense to assume that increases in random and unpredictable physical 
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screening of aviation workers can increase the expectation they will be screened on any 
given day, thereby providing a deterrent effect.  
To accomplish this, TSA should increase its use of the VIPR program to deploy a 
more diverse set of assets to operate random physical screening checkpoints. For 
example, TSA explosives detection canine teams can be randomly placed at various 
access points at differing times to screen aviation workers and their work bags. Federal 
air marshals can increase random ID checks and provide a visible presence to escalate the 
perception that law enforcement is monitoring all areas within the SIDA zones. VIPR 
teams give TSA more resource options for random aviation worker screening and can 
help mitigate the resource drain on the transportation security officer workforce from 
having to perform this function. As a security program, VIPR provides the benefit of 
additional physical screening and access control measures to detect and mitigate insider 
threats. Equally important is a random law enforcement presence in the SIDA zones to 
deter aviation workers from heading down the path to becoming insider who pose threats.  
Since TSA already operates the VIPR program, there are no immediately visible 
barriers to implementation from TSA’s perspective. Using VIPR operations to increase 
the expectation among aviation workers of physical and unpredictable screening is 
supported by the airport operators and airlines.251 This measure would likely receive 
widespread industry support based on feedback from the 2015 Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee report. The working group requested that TSA coordinate any 
access control and aviation worker physical screening procedure changes with the local 
airport stakeholders so they have an opportunity to provide feedback.252 Its 
recommendation for a “community-driven” approach is a good long-term practice for 
TSA when increasing VIPR operations. Good coordination with local airport operators 
and stakeholders should help TSA avoid unintended consequences and industry 
resistance. 
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2. Recommendation 2: Adopt CPNI’s Motivation Project to Identify If 
There Are Tangible Areas for Cultural Change 
TSA should consider committing to a long-term initiative to measure the levels of 
motivation and morale within its workforce. Conceivably, this will help TSA develop and 
fine tune the change requirements needed within the organization to become a high 
performing security culture capable of mitigating the insider threat through awareness 
and employee engagement on the issue. On the other hand, such an initiative might also 
indicate that TSA has already achieved a strong security culture requiring few changes. 
Either way, it is difficult to measure without undertaking this initiative. CPNI already has 
a good model to emulate for this initiative in its Motivation Project, and it could be a 
good starting point for TSA to undertake a similar measure.  
TSA should also adapt CPNI’s “Motivation Project” for its external stakeholders. 
Similar to CPNI’s outreach to other United Kingdom critical infrastructure facilities, TSA 
could also become the “consultant” on this issue to inspire cultural change not just within 
TSA but within the entire public-private aviation domain. TSA could offer and 
implement a survey and follow up analysis to help drive the organizational cultural 
changes needed to lead to better security awareness among aviation workers.  
Implementation of a large-scale workforce survey will require broad management 
buy in within TSA as well as proactive communication to ensure the agency is aware of 
the long-term goals of this project. It is unclear what the costs associated with a long-term 
workforce survey of this magnitude are. Fiscal restraints have the potential to become a 
significant implementation issue if there is not leadership buy in across TSA for this 
initiative. Hopefully, this hurdle will naturally be resolved by enacting recommendation 
3, described below. 
3. Recommendation 3: Utilize Lockheed Martin’s “Five Steps to 
Success” as a Baseline for Internal Review 
The literature reviewed in this thesis demonstrates that including a policy of 
continuous internal evaluation of anomalous employee behaviors is healthy for an insider 
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threat program.253 Employees are ideally positioned to identify new areas of vulnerability 
and concerning coworker behaviors. They should be able to proactively discuss these 
issues with management to preemptively address the problem as new vulnerabilities are 
discovered. For example, the technology to monitor employee behavior within an 
organization’s information technology systems is a twenty-first century practice that has 
become more common as more sensitive and classified information has gone digital. TSA 
should work toward a holistic approach to the insider threat problem that engages the 
entire workforce and management to incorporate “buy in” among the various functions 
within TSA.  
The cornerstones of Lockheed Martin’s Insider Threat Detection Program (ITDP) 
represent the most comprehensive recommended outline for TSA’s insider threat 
program. As described by Lockheed Martin, the ITDP is built around the following five 
key areas:  
1. Gain leadership support  
2. Leverage the latest technology 
3. Develop a communications plan 
4. Execute a training and awareness campaign 
5. Establish a governance structure.254  
The intent behind this recommendation is to further institutionalize the insider threat 
program in TSA. 
Barriers for implementation of an insider threat program at TSA should be 
minimal. This does not require additional intelligence or law enforcement authorities and 
avoids political interagency problems since the changes will take place within TSA only. 
Internally, implementation requires leadership buy in, proactive communication vertically 
and horizontally across TSA personnel, and employee surveys to help identify baseline 
knowledge, as noted in the previous recommendation. Costs are also minimal since the 
                                                 
253 ODNI, National Counterintelligence Strategy, 4.  
254 Lockheed Martin, 5 Steps to Develop, 3.  
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five key areas center mostly on establishing agency-wide support and awareness of the 
insider threat.  
4. Recommendation 4: Create or Hire a Cadre of CI Staff at TSA 
Headquarters to Develop Insider Threat Programs and Perform “Soft 
Inquiries” 
One of the key advantages of the Lockheed Martin ITDP is full integration of its 
CI cadre within each stage of its insider threat policy development. As a private 
company, Lockheed Martin can work unilaterally in this regard except that it must refer 
insider threat cases to the FBI for prosecution since it is not a law enforcement or a Title 
50 agency. However, its CI professionals can conduct the initial investigation and also 
develop the front-end policy, training, and procedures for the company’s insider threat 
programs in the context of program security and CI. Within this example, there is some 
applicability to TSA. The agency could similarly hire CI professionals to develop TSA’s 
internal policies and programs, including internal investigation referrals. Like Lockheed 
Martin, TSA would at some point need to hand over an investigation to the FBI for 
further action and prosecution, but it could develop the investigatory leads (“soft 
inquires”) and determine the veracity of the cases internally first.   
Implementation should not be too challenging. DHS I&A is already in the process 
of embedding experienced CI officers within each DHS operational component.255 The 
primary purpose is to help counter foreign intelligence entity threats within the DHS 
components. However, this resource is by nature dual purpose since foreign intelligence 
entities often recruit an insider threat within a targeted organization (often referred to as 
the “CI insider threat”).256 TSA should leverage this resource to assist in hiring (or 
training) additional CI officers. By performing only initial soft inquiries, TSA avoids 
over extending itself into the FBI’s lead CI role in the United States. As a bonus, this 
process could ensure more soft inquiries are performed and only the cases meeting the 
threshold of a foreign intelligence entity issue or an insider threat prosecution are referred 
to the FBI, thus helping to preserve FBI resources. It is conceivable there could be some 
                                                 
255 Taylor, Hayes, and McComb, Counterintelligence and Insider Threats, 4.  
256 Vickers, Department of Defense Instruction, 13.  
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pushback from the FBI based on a misperception of the intent behind the soft inquiry. It 
is not proposed to extend into the FBI’s lead CI role in the United States. Proactive soft 
inquiries could lead to more referred cases to the FBI. With some proactive 
communication by I&A and TSA with the FBI, pushback could be minimized. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis largely serves as a starting point for TSA to begin building on its 
insider threat security programs. There might be a few areas where TSA can become a 
little more aggressive and independent in developing a CI program, but further research is 
required to determine the legality of such operations. The focus of the proposed research 
below is geared towards exploring what can be done to provide more authority to TSA 
and thus reduce TSA’s reliance on other agencies for CI operations to counter insider 
threats. 
1. Are there other legal authorities such as the ATSA or E.O. 12333 that 
TSA can leverage for justification to conduct its own CI operations 
leading to domestic intelligence collection or to a prosecution?  
2. Is there legal authority that TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service can use to 
execute CI operations in the same way described above? 
3. Can TSA work with I&A’s CI officers to conduct similar CI operations 
under Title 50 authority on its employees and contractors?257 
C. CONCLUSION 
Successful insider threat programs require a strong balance between security, CI, 
and organizational culture. The recommendations presented in this chapter are designed 
to be immediately implementable and will help TSA fine tune its defensive programs 
while initiating the beginning of an offensive campaign in the form of a CI program. The 
end goal should be to drive security and CI programs to a point at which they intersect 
and seamlessly feed each other. This is where the NCSC believes the solutions are to 
counter an organization’s adversaries, including insider threats.258  
                                                 
257 War and National Defense, U.S.C. Title 50 § 3001 (2011), 435.  
258 “How We Work,” NCSC.  
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The importance of TSA taking immediate actions to develop robust insider threat 
programs cannot be overstated as there are more than 450 federalized airports tucked into 
every part of the United States. These airports connect people, goods, and services and 
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